College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Supreme Court Preview

Conferences, Events, and Lectures

2007

Section 6: Criminal Law
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School

Repository Citation
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School, "Section 6: Criminal Law" (2007). Supreme Court Preview. 222.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview/222

Copyright c 2007 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview

VI. CRIMINAL
In This Section:
New Case: 06-6330 Kimbrough v. United States
Synopsis and Questions Presented

p. 321

"Crack Sentences Questioned"
David G. Savage

p. 323

"'Crack' vs. Powder Cocaine: The Sentencing Dilemma"
Lyle Denniston

p. 324

"Commission Recommends Lighter Minimum Sentence for Crack
Cocaine Conviction"
Kasie Hunt

p. 327

"Lawmakers Consider Lessening Crack Penalties"
Donna Leinwand

p. 329

"Report to Congress on Federal Cocaine Sentencing Policy
United States Sentencing Commission, 2007

p. 331

"Justice Department Releases Report Analyzing Crack and
Powder Cocaine Penalties"
United States Department of Justice, 2002

p. 335

New Case: 06-7949 Gall v. United States
Synopsis and Questions Presented

p. 337

"U.S. Supreme Court Picks Up Replacements for St. Louis Man"
Allison Retka

p. 343

"A Possible Sentencing 'Safe Harbor' in New Rulings"
Marcia Coyle

p. 344

New Case: 06-10119 Snyder v. Louisiana
Synopsis and Questions Presented

p. 346

"Batson and the 'O.J. factor"'
Lyle Denniston

p. 360

319

"Court Rejects Rehearing for Death Row Inmate"
Paul Pupura

p. 363

"Racial Currents May Drag Verdict Under"
James Gill

p. 364

"Court Ordered to Revisit Ruling"
Paul Purpura

p. 366

"Killer Gets Death in Slashing"
Joe Darby

p. 368

"Man Gets Death Penalty"
Joe Darby

p. 369

New Case: 06-8273 Danforth v. Minnesota
Synopsis and Questions Presented

p. 371

"Court Query on Teague Retroactivity"
Lyle Denniston

p. 378

"Judge Raises Repeat Pedophile's Sentence Because of His History"
James Walsh

p. 380

"Jury Ponders Sex Abuse Case Against Ex-Attorney"
David Peterson

p. 381

"Former Attorney Practices Self-Defense in Child Sex Abuse Case"
John McIntyre

p. 383

"Child Sex Abuser Given Prison Sentence"
Larry Oakes

p. 385

320

Kimbrough v. United States
(06-6330)

Ruling Below: (U.S. v. Kimbrough, 174 Fed.Appx. 798 (4th Cir. 2006), cert granted, 127 S.Ct.
2933, 2007 WL 1660977 (U.S.), 75 U.S.L.W. 3661, 75 U.S.L.W. 3657).
Kimbrough plead guilty to distributing more than 50 grams of crack cocaine and possessing a
firearm in connection with a drug-related crime. The sentencing guideline range was to be
between 168 and 210 months for the drug charges and 60 months for the firearms charge. The
district court sentenced Kimbrough to 120 months on each of the drug charges, served
concurrently, and 60 months for the gun charges, serving consecutively. The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the sentence was per se unreasonable because it fell outside the
guidelines range and was based on disagreements over disparities between crack and powder
cocaine sentences. The Fourth Circuit stated it was bound by precedent to vacate the sentence.
Questions Presented: (1) In carrying out the mandate of §3553(a) to impose a sentence that is
"sufficient but not greater than necessary" on a defendant, may a district court consider either the
impact of the so-called "100:1 crack/powder ratio" implemented in the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines or the reports and recommendations of the U.S. Sentencing Commission in 1995,
1997, and 2002 regarding the ratio? (2) In carrying out the mandate of §3553(a) to impose a
sentence that is "sufficient but not greater than necessary" upon a defendant, how is a district
court to consider and balance the various factors spelled out in the statute, and in particular,
subsection (a)(6), which addresses "the need to avoid unwarranted disparity among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct"?

UNITED STATES of America,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Derrick KIMBROUGH,
Defendant-Appellee

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
UNPUBLISHED
Decided May 9, 2006
PER CURIAM:
The Government appeals the district court's
imposition of a sentence outside of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines range
based, in part. on the district court's

disagreement with the disparity between
sentences for crack and powder cocaine
violations. We have jurisdiction to review
the sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742
(West 2000). We review post-Booker
sentences for reasonableness. United States
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v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir.
2005).
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to
distributing fifty or more grams of crack
cocaine, distributing cocaine, conspiring to
distribute fifty grams or more of crack
cocaine, and possessing a firearm in
connection with a drug trafficking crime.
The sentencing guideline range was 168 to
210 months imprisonment for the drug
counts and 60 consecutive months for the
firearm count. Based, in part, on the district
court's disagreement with the sentencing
disparity for crack and powder cocaine
violations, the district court sentenced
Kimbrough to 120 months on each of the
three drug violations, to be served
concurrently, and sixty months on the
firearms charge, to be served consecutively.

According to our recent decision in United
States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2006),
a sentence that is outside the guidelines
range is per se unreasonable when it is based
on a disagreement with the sentencing
disparity for crack and powder cocaine
offenses. Because the district court
concluded that the crack to powder cocaine
disparity warranted a sentence below the
applicable sentencing guideline range, we
are constrained to vacate Kimbrough's
sentence and to remand the case for
resentencing. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument
would not aid in the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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"Crack Sentences Questioned"
The Los Angeles Times
June 12, 2007
David G. Savage

The Supreme Court agreed for the first time
Monday to reconsider the long prison terms
meted out to the mostly black defendants who
are convicted of selling crack cocaine. [The
case is Kinibrough v. United States.]

At least 25,000 defendants per year are sent to
federal prison on crack-cocaine charges, and
their prison terms are usually 50 percent
longer than drug dealers who sell powder
cocaine.
This disparity, with its racial overtones, has
been controversial for two decades since
Congress ramped up the "war on drugs" in
response to a crack epidemic sweeping many
cities. Crack was targeted for stiffer penalties
because it was viewed as more dangerous
than powder cocaine.
At the time, lawmakers set mandatory
minimum prison terms for drug sellers based
on the quantity of drugs sold. A sale of five
grams of crack cocaine triggers the same fiveyear prison term as selling 500 grams of
powder cocaine, even though they are the
same substance.
Critics have said this 100-to-i disparity is
unfair and racially biased because dealers in
crack cocaine are more often black. while
powder cocaine is said to be sold more often
to whites and by whites.

Department nor the courts have been willing
to lessen the prison terms for crack dealers.
In a speech to the American Bar Association
four years ago, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
called these mandatory minimum sentences
"unwise and unjust." He urged the lawyers to
lobby Congress to repeal the mandatory
minimum sentences.
Despite pleas from family members and legal
activists, the laws have remained unchanged.
For its part, the Supreme Court did not signal
Monday a willingness to say these sentences
are unconstitutional. Instead, the justices
agreed to decide whether trial judges should
have more leeway to impose somewhat
lighter sentences in crack-cocaine cases.
In the fall, the justices will hear the case of a
convicted drug dealer from Norfolk, Va., who
was given a 15-year prison term for selling
both crack and powder cocaine. The trial
judge noted the U.S. sentencing guidelines
called for a prison term of between 19 and 22
years, in part because the crack-cocaine sale
raised the stakes. But he also noted the
defendant, Derrick Kimbrough, had served
honorably in the Army.
But the U.S. court of appeals in Richmond
ruled the defendant must be given the 19- to
22-year prison term called for in the
sentencing rules.

But until now, neither lawmakers, the Justice
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"'Crack' vs. Powder Cocaine:
The Sentencing Dilemma"
SCOTUS Blog
June 11, 2007
Lyle Denniston
The U.S. Sentencing Commission's latest
report to Congress on cocaine sentencing
can be found at the Commission's website,
under "Report
to
Congress-Federal
Cocaine Sentencing Policy." It recommends
that Congress alter the 100-to-1 crack-topowder ratio, but, in the meantime, proposes
a reduction in the Sentencing Guideline
range for cocaine offenses. That change in
range will take effect Nov. 1 unless
Congress objects. (The report is 202 pages
long.)
Congress in 1986 adopted a federal
sentencing policy that those who commit
crimes involving "crack" cocaine are to be
punished on a 100-to-1 ratio compared to
those whose crimes involve cocaine in
powder form.
The U.S.
Sentencing
Commission for years has asked Congress to
narrow the difference, to no avail. Yet
Congress has never ordered the Commission
to put the ratio into the federal Sentencing
Guidelines. And federal trial judges in
recent months have been experimenting with
easing up, comparatively, on cocaine crime
sentences. That combination of conflicting
circumstances may be sorted out by the
Supreme Court, in the new Term that starts
on Oct. 1.
Here is an example of how the 100-to-1 ratio
works: an individual who deals five grams
of crack cocaine faces the same sentence as
a defendant who deals 500 grams of powder
cocaine under the Guidelines.
On Monday, the Court-long reluctant to
review the 100-1 crack-to-powder ratio-

opted to grant review of a clear-cut test case
on the issue. It is Kimbrough v. U.S. (docket
06-6330). The diligent efforts of a federal
public defender in Alexandria. VAMichael S. Nachmanoff-appeared to have
helped persuade the Court that the time had
come to take on the question.
Because the case raises the question of a
federal judge's power to set a sentence that
may fall below a Guideline range, the Court
seems to have concluded that it should
in below-range
interest
its
expand
sentencing to include the basic controversy
over crack vs. powder sentencing in the new
era of advisory rather than mandatory use of
the Guidelines. The Court had signaled its
interest in below-range sentencing by
agreeing to hear this Term the case of
Claiborne v. U.S. (06-5618), but that case
has been ordered vacated as moot because of
the death of Mario Claiborne. On Monday,
the Court, along with granting review of the
Kimbrough case, also announced that it will
consider next Term another case on the core
question of the "reasonableness" of belowrange sentences. That new case is Gall v.
U.S. (06-7949). (The Court also has
apparently decided to go ahead, this Term,
with a decision in the Guidelines case of
Rita v. U.S., 06-5754. testing whether a
sentence within a Guideline range is to be
presumed on appeal to be reasonable.)
Relying on the Court's 2005 decision in U.S.
v. Booker turning the Guidelines regime into
an advisory scheme only, the Kimbrough
petition asks the Court to cliarify how much
authority-if any-sentencing judges have
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to vary the 100-to-i ratio in order to ensure
that punishment for a cocaine conviction is
"sufficient but not greater than necessary"
and does not lead to "unwarranted disparity"
in sentencing. It asks two questions,
paraphrased here:
(1) may a District Court judge consider the
Sentencing Commission's repeated reports
finding that the 100-to-i crack vs. powder
disparity exaggerates the seriousness of
crack crimes, and (2) how is a District Court
to balance the various factors that Congress
has told sentencing judges to consider,
especially avoidance of sentencing disparity,
under the Guidelines regime.
Nachmanoff's client is Derrick Kimbrough,
a Gulf War veteran and construction worker,
who was arrested by city police officers in
Norfolk, Va., with another man and charged
with conspiracy with intent to distribute
cocaine and possession with intent to
distribute it. Prosecutors said that the two
were found with 56 grams of crack cocaine
and 92.1 grams of cocaine powder.
Kimbrough had prior misdemeanor offenses.
but no prior felonies.
All things considered, including a firearm
offense, Kimbrough faced a sentence in a
Guideline range of 228 to 270 months-that
is, 19 to 22 1/2 years. His defense lawyer,
arguing that the Guidelines regime directs a
judge to take in a variety of factors, urged
the trial judge to set a total sentence of 180
months-or 15 years. On the crack vs.
powder issue, the lawyer noted that
Kimbrough actually had more powder than
crack when arrested (almost twice as much),
and called attention to the findings of the
Sentencing Commission. in repeated reports,
that the ratio exaggerates the relative
harmfulness of crack.

The judge, noting that the sentencing law
directed the court not to impose a sentence
greater than necessary to serve the
sentencing factors, called a sentence of 19 to
22 1/2 years "ridiculous." The judge said
that the 100-to-1 punishment disparity drove
the offense level in the case higher than
necessary to do justice. Those statements
were based on the Sentencing Commission's
views. Following the 100-to-1 factor, the
judge concluded, would result in an
inappropriately high sentence. The term was
set at 180 months-that is, 15 years. That,
the judge said, was "clearly long enough
under the circumstances."
The Fourth Circuit Court, in a brief opinion
reacting to the government's appeal of the
sentence, struck down the 180-month term.
Based on its basic ruling on the issue in U.S.
v. Eura (a case now pending in a petition in
the Supreme Court, 05-11569), the Circuit
Court ruled that a District Court may not
vary from the advisory sentencing range on
the basis of the 100-to-i ratio or on the
views of the Sentencing Commission. "In
arriving at a reasonable sentencing," that
Court had said in the Eura case, "the District
Court simply must not rely on a fact that
would result in sentencing disparity that
totally is at odds with the will of Congress."
The Justice Department has been opposing
Supreme Court review of the crack vs.
powder question, and has done so, for
example, in the Eura case. In response to
Kimbrough's appeal, the Department
suggested that the Court might want to hold
it until it had decided the Claiborne case, or
perhaps even deny it outright because of the
government view that judges cannot set a
sentence below the range simply because
they disagree with a sentencing policy
adopted by Congress-that is, the 100-to-i
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ratio. The government also had contended
that there is no split in the Circuit Courts on
that question.

spectrum is the Third Circuit, joined by the
dissenting judges in the Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits, which would allow a district court
to consider the 100:1 ratio.

But Kimbrough's petition and reply argues
that, as of now, there is a definite split. "On
one end of the spectrum are the Fourth and
Eighth Circuits, which have held that under
no circumstances can a district court
consider either the ratio or the [Sentencing
Commission] reports. . . . In the middle is

the dissenting judge in the Fourth Circuit,
whose position has been adopted by the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, and possibly
by the Second Circuit, which would permit a
district court to use the Sentencing
Commission reports in evaluating the case
before it.

. .

. .

. Accordingly,

this Court should step in now to resolve the
issue."
The case was ready for the Court's
consideration in February, but it took no
action on it. Then, in March, public defender
Nachmanoff notified the Court that the split
had deepened further, with the D.C. Circuit
Court directing sentencing judges to
consider the 100-to-I ratio "and the
problems it raises" in crack cases-thus
aligning that Circuit with the Third Circuit's
view....

. Finally, on the other end of the
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"Commission Recommends Lighter Minimum
Sentence for Crack Cocaine Conviction"
The Associated Press
April 28, 2007
Kasie Hunt
WASHINGTON-A
first-time
crackcocaine conviction should mean a lower
federal minimum sentence than under
current guidelines, according to a judicial
agency that has raised concerns about a
disparity in punishment for people caught
with crack or powder cocaine.
The U.S. Sentencing Commission voted to
lower the recommended sentencing range
for those caught with 5 grams or more of
crack cocaine from 63 months to 78 months
to a range of 51 months to 63 months. Those
with at least 50 grams should serve 97
months to 121 months in prison, not 121
months to 151 months, as the guidelines
now say, the commission said late Friday.
At issue is a 1986 law that includes what
critics have called the 100-to-1 disparity:
Trafficking in 5 grams of cocaine carries a
mandatory five-year prison sentence, but it
takes 500 grams of cocaine powder to
warrant the same sentence.
This is the fourth time the commission, an
independent agency in the judicial branch.
has recommended that Congress narrow the
sentencing gap. Previous recommendations.
which were not adopted, have included
raising the penalties for powder cocaine and
lowering them for crack.
The commission's guidelines are designed
to ensure that federal sentences do not vary
widely from courtroom to courtroom. They
were mandatory until 2005. That year, the
Supreme Court said making the guidelines
mandatory violated a defendant's Sixth

Amendment right to a jury trial because they
call for judges to make factual decisions that
could add to prison time, such as the amount
of drugs involved in a crime.
The commission planned to send its
recommendation to Congress before May 1.
Lawmakers would have until Nov. I to
reject the new guidelines before they would
become law.
Advocates for changing the law point to
crime statistics that show crack is more of an
urban and minority drug while cocaine
powder is used more often by the affluent,
and that harsher penalties for crack cocaine
unfairly punish blacks.
"This unjust policy is based on little more
than politics and urban myths. yet it's been
allowed to stand for over 20 years,
devastating African-American communities
in the process," said Caroline Fredrickson,
director of the ACLU's legislative office in
Washington.
In November, U.S. District Judge Reggie B.
Walton told the agency that federal laws
requiring dramatically longer sentences for
crack cocaine than for cocaine powder were
"unconscionable" and contributed to the
perception within minority communities that
courts are unfair.

While Congress would have to overturn the
1986 law to erase minimum sentences, the
commission's new rule "provides some
relief to crack cocaine offenders impacted
by the disparity created by federal cocaine
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sentencing policy," the commission said in a
statement.
But the Justice Department has urged the
commission to let Congress deal with the
inconsistency. "While we are willing to
discuss addressing the disparity in the ratio
between crack and powder cocaine, we
believe that it should be done in the broader
context of sentencing reform," spokesman

Brian Roehrkasse said.
House Judiciary Committee Chairman Rep.
John Conyers, D-Mich., a longtime advocate
of equalizing penalties for crack and powder
cocaine, has said he will hold hearings to
address the issue.
[The court will address these issues in
Kim brough v. United States.]
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"Lawmakers Consider Lessening
Crack Penalties"
USA Today
March 11, 2007
Donna Leinwand
Momentum is building in Congress to ease
crack cocaine sentencing guidelines, which
the American Civil Liberties Union and
other critics say have filled prisons with
low-level drug dealers and addicts whose
punishments were much worse than their
cnmes.
Federal prison sentences for possessing or
selling crack have far exceeded those for
powder cocaine for two decades. House
Crime Subcommittee chairman Robert
Scott, D-Va., a longtime critic of such
sentencing policies, plans to hold hearings
on crack sentences this year. In the Senate,
Republican Jeff Sessions of Alabama is
drawing bipartisan support for his proposal
to ease crack sentences.
"I believe that as a matter of law
enforcement and good public policy that
crack cocaine sentences are too heavy and
can't be justified," Sessions says. "People
don't want us to be soft on crime, but I think
we ought to make the law more rational."
The mandatory federal sentencing guidelines
passed by Congress in 1986 require a judge
to impose the same sentence for possession
of 5 grams of crack as for 500 grams of
powder cocaine: five years in prison.
Congress passed the sentencing laws just
after the fatal crack overdose of University
of Maryland basketball star Len Bias on
June 19. 1986, and as crack was emerging in
urban areas, says Alfred Blumstein, a
professor at Carnegie Mellon University in
Pittsburgh who researches crime. Crack

cocaine was associated with violent, openair drug markets, he says.
"There was a lot of public concern about
violence," Blumstein says.
Jesselyn McCurdy with the ACLU says
much of the violence associated with crack
stemmed from territorial disputes between
dealers, not from those using the drug. She
says the stricter sentences for crack have
filled prisons with low-level, primarily
African-American addicts rather than the
major drug traffickers Congress sought to
punish. An ACLU study in October 2006
found that 80% of crack defendants were
black.
"People have seen how it plays out in racial
disparities," McCurdy says. "The stumbling
block on both sides of the aisle has been this
issue around appearing to be soft on crime.
But this is about equalizing an injustice."
Sessions' bill would lessen the sentencing
disparity by increasing punishments for
powder cocaine and decreasing them for
crack. Crimes involving crack would still
draw stiffer sentences, but the difference
would not be as dramatic. The bill has
drawn support from Democratic Sen. Ken
Salazar, a former state attorney general from
Colorado, Democratic Sen. Mark Pryor, a
former state attorney general from Arkansas,
and Republican Sen. John Cornyn. a former
Texas Supreme Court justice and attorney
general.
In the House of Representatives, two bills
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calling for Congress to equalize the
sentences for powder cocaine and crack
were filed in January.
"We're going to address all the mandatory
minimums," said Scott, chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee
on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland
Security. "The crack cocaine is probably the
most egregious because of its draconian
number of years for relatively small
amounts."
Opposition to weaker sentences has come
from
police,
prosecutors
and
law
enforcement agencies such as the Justice
Department and the Drug Enforcement
Administration.
"We believe the current federal sentencing
policy and guidelines for crack cocaine
offenses are reasonable," Justice spokesman
Dean Boyd says.
Higher penalties for crack offenses reflect its
greater harm, he says, adding that crack
traffickers are more likely to use weapons
and have more significant criminal histories
than powder cocaine dealers.
"Congress thought by having very harsh
sentences. it would deter the spread of crack
into the inner cities and around the country,"
Sessions says. "The truth is, it didn't stop it.

It spread very rapidly. Now we need to ask
ourselves, what is the right sentence for this
bad drug. I think it's time to adjust. I think
it's past time to do this."
Scientists say there is no pharmaceutical
justification for having different sentencing
rules for crack and powder cocaine.
The powder is cocaine hydrochloride salt,
which can be snorted into the nose or
dissolved in water and injected. Crack is
cocaine mixed with water and ammonia or
baking soda then heated to remove the
hydrochloride. The resulting pure cocaine
rock can be smoked.
"Once the cocaine is in your bloodstream,
there's absolutely no difference between
powder cocaine and crack cocaine," says
Bruce Goldberger, director of toxicology at
the University of Florida College of
Medicine.
The quicker the drug enters the bloodstream,
the more intense its effects, he said. Two of
the quickest routes are smoking, which is
done with crack, and injecting. which is
done by dissolving the powder and shooting
it into the bloodstream.
[The court will address these issues in
Kim brough v. United States.]
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Report to Congress on Federal
Cocaine Sentencing Policy
United States Sentencing Commission
May 15, 2007
Executive Summary
... Since 1995 the Sentencing Commission
has advocated for amendment of the 100:1
statutory ratio that triggers penalties for
crack and powder cocaine offenders. As
part of its priorities for its 2006-2007
Sentencing
cycle,
the
amendment
Commission continued its work with the
congressional, executive, and judicial
branches of the government and other
interested parties on cocaine sentencing
policy, including reevaluating its 2002
report to Congress, Cocaine and Federal
Sentencing Policy.
The Commission held two hearings to
discuss federal cocaine sentencing during
which the Commission received testimony
from witnesses representing the Department
of Justice, Federal judiciary, defense bar,
law enforcement, academics, treatment and
medical experts, and interested community
activists, among others. The Commission
also received a number of letters from
Members of Congress and the public about
this important issue. The Commission also
conducted its own research and analyses of
sentencing data and trends, reviewed the
most recently available literature on the
issue, and conducted an exhaustive case law
review. This extensive research effort
culminated in the enclosed 2007 Report to
the Congress: Cocaine and Federal
Sentencing Policy.
The 2007 Report

In this 2007 report, the Commission
concludes, as it did in 2002. that-

(1) The current quantity-based
penalties overstate the relative
harmfulness of crack cocaine
compared to powder cocaine.
(2) The current quantity-based
penalties sweep too broadly and
apply most often to lower level
offenders.
(3) The current quantity-based
penalties overstate the seriousness
of most crack cocaine offenses
and fail to provide adequate
proportionality.
(4) The current severity of crack
cocaine penalties mostly impacts
minorities.
Accordingly, through its report, the
and
Commission again unanimously
strongly urges Congress to act promptly on
the following recommendations:
(1) the five-year and ten-year
statutory mandatory minimum
threshold quantities for crack
cocaine offenses to focus the
penalties more closely on serious
and major traffickers as described
generally in the legislative history
of the 1986 Act.
mandatory
the
(2) Repeal
minimum penalty provision for
simple possession of crack cocaine
under 21 U.S.C. § 844.
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(3) Reject addressing the 100-to-i
drug quantity ratio by decreasing
the
five-year
and ten-year
statutory mandatory minimum
threshold quantities for powder
cocaine offenses, as there is no
evidence to justify such an
increase
in
quantity-based
penalties for powder cocaine
offenses.

The Commission further recommends that
these
implementing
legislation
any
emergency
include
recommendations
amendment authority for the Commission to
incorporate the statutory changes in the
Federal sentencing guidelines. Emergency
amendment authority would enable the
Commission to minimize the lag between
any statutory and guideline modifications
for cocaine offenders....

Sample Statistics and Other Information from the
2007 Report on Federal Cocaine Sentencing Policy
Number of Cocaine Offenders Across Time (See Fig. 2-1, 2007 Report)
Year

Crack

Powder

1992
2002

2.301
4.795

6,671
5.243

2006

5,397

5,744

FY2006 Average Sentence Length (See Fig. 2-2, 2007 Report)

Crack
Powder

=
=

122 months
85 months

Difference in Sentences Across Time (See Fig. 2-3, 2007 Report)

1992 = 25.3% difference between powder and crack cocaine sentences
2006 = 43.5% difference between powder and crack cocaine sentences
Race and Demographics (See p. 1 5 -17, 2007 Report)
-

Blacks still comprise the majority of

in

2006.

White

powder

is

cocaine defendants have declined

decreasing from 91.4% in 1992 to

from 32.3% in 1992 to 14.3% in

81.8% in 2006. White offenders
now comprise 8.8% of crack
defendants, up from 3.2% in 1992.

2006.

crack

-

57.5%

offenders,

but

that

Powder cocaine defendants are now

predominantly Hispanic, growing
from 39.8% of defenders in 1992 to

In 2006, nearly all crack defendants
were U.S. citizens, whereas only
60.6% of powder cocaine defendants
were U.S. citizens.
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Offender Function (FY2005 Data Sample) (See Figs. 2-4 to 2-6, 2007 Report)
Crack [Cocaine]
-

Powder [Cocaine]

55.4% of crack defendants

were

-

categorized as couriers or mules
receiving average sentences of 60
months

categorized as street-level dealers
receiving average sentences of 97
months
-

22.7% of crack defendants were

33.1% of powder defendants were

-

categorized as wholesalers receiving
average sentences of 142 months
(but of these, almost 40% did not
perform this function routinely)

24.1% of powder defendants were

categorized as wholesalers receiving
average sentences of 78 months

Application of Role Adjustments for Each Offender Function
FY 2005 Drug Sample (Figs. 2-23 and 2-24, 2007 Report)
Powder Cocaine
Mitigating Aggravating
Role
Role

Crack Cocaine
Mitigating Aggravating
Role
Role

Importer/High-Level Dealer
Organizer/Leader/Grower/Manufacturer
Financier/Money Launderer

3.8%

16.0%

0.0%

4.4%

2.8%

51.4%

0.0%

52.6%

Wholesaler

2.7%

0.9%

2.7%

3.8%

Manager Supervisor

3.8%

30.4%

8.7%

43.5%

24.6%
8.9%
44.4%

3.3%
0.0%
0.0%

9.5%
7.0%
50.0%

0.0%
1.1%
0.0%

35.2%

1.1%

40.0%

0.0%

Function

Pilot/Captain/Bodyguard/Chemist/Cook
Broker/Steerer
Street-level Dealer
Courier/Mule
Renter/Loader/Lookout/Enabler/
User/All Other

I ... I
Violence Involvement in Powder and Crack Cocaine Offenses
(Fig 2-20, 2007 Report and Fig. 19, 2002 Report)
Powder Cocaine

Crack Cocaine

No Violence

2000 Drug
Sample
91.0%

2005 Drug
Sample
93.8%

2000 Drug
Sample
88.4%

2005 Drug
Sample
89.6%

Death

3.4%

1.6%

3.4%0

2.2%

Any Injury
Threats

1.4%
4.2%

1.5%
3.2%

4.5%
3.7%

3.3%
4.9%
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The reduction in violence associated with crack cocaine trafficking since 1992 is consistent with
the aging of the crack cocaine traffickers and users.

Other Findings
-

quantity required to trigger the fiveyear mandatory minimum yields
between 2,500 and 5,000 doses.
Five grams of crack cocaine, the
quantity
required
to
trigger
application
of
the
five-year
mandatory minimum yields between
ten and 50 doses. (See p. 6 2 , 2007
Report)
-

Cocaine patients present at treatment

having the same symptoms and
receive the same treatment regardless
of the drug ingested. (See p. 62, 66,
2007 Report)
-

-

Although both forms of the drug are

addictive, the risk of addiction may
be greater for crack cocaine than
powder cocaine on the typical user

The negative

effects

of prenatal

exposure to crack cocaine are
identical to the effects of prenatal
exposure to powder cocaine and are
significantly
less severe
than
previously believed. (See pp. 61, 6770, 2007 Report)

Crack cocaine and powder cocaine

are both powerful stimulants, and
both forms of cocaine cause identical
effects (See pp. 61-62, 64, 2007
Report)
-

because of their different methods of
typical administration (typically
crack cocaine is smoked and powder
cocaine is snorted). (See pp. 62-66,
2007 Report)

500 grams of powder cocaine, the

-

In 2002, fourteen states maintained

some form of distinction between
crack cocaine and powder cocaine
offenses. Only one state, Iowa,
maintained a 100:1 ratio between the
two forms of the drug but that was
only for purposes of the statutory
maximum penalties. (See p.73, 2002
Report) In 2007, only thirteen states
maintain such a distinction. (See pp.
98-106, 2007 Report for a discussion
of state cocaine sentencing policy)
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"Justice Department Releases Report Analyzing
Crack and Powder Cocaine Penalties"
U.S. Department ofJustice
March 19, 2002
Press Release
WASHINGTON,
D.C.-The
Justice
Department's Office of Legal Policy today
released an analysis of prison sentences for
federal
cocaine
offenses.
The report
concludes that, for comparable quantities of
cocaine, the differential between prison
sentences for crack traffickers and powder
traffickers is much smaller than commonly
believed.
"The public debate over the crack-powder
disparity has proceeded on bad facts and
misconceptions. If this policy debate is to
have any real meaning, it must be premised
on correct facts," said Viet D. Dinh, Assistant
Attorney General for Legal Policy.
Public debate over sentences for federal
cocaine offenses has focused on the 100 tol
differential in the amounts of powder and
crack cocaine that trigger the 5- and 10-year
mandatory
minimum
sentences.
This
differential is commonly distorted to imply
that sentences for crack cocaine are vastly
greater than sentences for powder cocaine. A
closer examination of the federal penalty
structure for cocaine offenses reveals that the
often-cited 100 to 1 differential is misleading.
The Office of Legal Policy's analysis, based
on actual sentences imposed for 46,413 crack
and powder defendants between 1996-2000,
demonstrates that:
Crack defendants convicted of trafficking in
less than 25 grams of cocaine received an
average sentence that is 4.8 times longer than
the sentence received by a defendant
convicted of trafficking the comparable
quantity of powder. The ratio between

average crack and powder sentences for
defendants convicted of trafficking in
between 15 and 49.9 kilograms of cocaine is
2.4 to 1.
For defendants who possessed weapons, the
ratio between average crack and powder
sentences for lower amounts of cocaine is 2.9
to 1. For the highest amounts of cocaine, the
ratio is 1.6 tol.
For defendants with the highest criminal
history levels, the average sentence for crack
defendants ranged from 1.6 to 1.3 times
longer (depending on the amount of cocaine)
than the average sentence for defendants
convicted of trafficking like quantities of
powder.
For defendants with the lowest criminal
histories convicted of trafficking the lower
quantities of cocaine, the average crack
sentence is 8.3 times greater than the average
powder sentence-1,637 out of 22,896 (or 7
percent) of crack defendants examined in this
study fall into this category. However. for
offenders convicted of trafficking in higher
amounts of cocaine. the ratio of average crack
to powder sentences is 2 to 1.
Crack cocaine is a dangerous drug that has a
devastating effect on its victims. For example.
in one recent study, 86.7 percent of women
surveyed were not involved in prostitution in
the year before starting crack use; fully onethird became involved in prostitution in the
year after they began use. Women who were
already involved in prostitution dramatically
increased their involvement. with rates nearly
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four times higher than before beginning crack
use.
Another recent study found that women who
used crack cocaine had much higher than
average rates of victimization than women
who did not. Among an Ohio sample of 171
adult female crack users, 62 percent had been
physically attacked since the onset of crack
use. Rape was reported by 32 percent of the
women since they began using crack, and
among these. 83 percent reported being high
on crack when the rape occurred, as were an
estimated 57 percent of the perpetrators.
These and many other statistics and studies
tell the story of the devastation that cocaine,
and crack cocaine specifically, bring to the
nation-especially its minority communities.
Lowering crack penalties would simply send
the wrong message-that we care more about
crack dealers then we do about the people and
the communities victimized by crack.
Further,

lowering

crack

penalties

is

inconsistent with a rejuvenated national fight
against illegal drug use. The recently released
Attorney General's drug enforcement strategy
has two essential elements: modifying
individual behavior to discourage and reduce
drug use and addiction, and disrupting the
market for illegal drugs. Lowering penalties
for trafficking crack cocaine would be
inconsistent with both objectives.
In his testimony today before the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, Deputy Attorney
General Lany D. Thompson expressed the
Department's view that the current federal
sentencing policy and guidelines for crack
cocaine offenses are proper, and that it would
be more appropriate to address the differential
between crack and powder cocaine by
recommending that penalties for powder
cocaine be increased. The Department would
oppose any effort by the Commission to issue
guidelines that do not adhere to the
congressionally enacted statutes that define
and prescribe penalties for federal cocaine
offenses.
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Gall v. United States
(06-7949)
Ruling Below: (U.S. v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006), cert granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933, 168 L.
Ed. 2d 261, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 7525).
In early 2000, Brian Gall entered into and participated in a conspiracy to distribute the drug
"ecstasy" in Iowa. In August of that same year, Gall withdrew from the conspiracy after earning
an estimated $30,000 through distribution of ecstasy. Four years later, Gall was indicted for
involvement in the conspiracy and turned himself in. Gall pleaded guilty and was sentenced to
probation, although his guideline range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was 30-37 months

imprisonment. The Government appealed, asserting that the sentence was unreasonable.
Questions Presented: Whether, when determining the "reasonableness" of a district court
sentence under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), it is appropriate to require district
courts to justify a deviation from the United States Sentencing Guidelines with a finding of
extraordinary circumstances.

UNITED STATES of America, Appellant,
B.

Brian Michael GALL, Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit
Decided May 12. 2006
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]

SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Brian Michael Gall pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to distribute a mixture containing
methylenedioxymethamphetamine
("MDMA"), a Schedule I controlled
substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(b)(1)(C) and 846. The district court
imposed a sentence of 36 months' probation
and a $100 special assessment. The
government appeals the sentence, arguing
that it is unreasonable. We conclude that
Gall's
sentence
is
unreasonable.

Accordingly,
resentencing.

we remand

the

case

for

I. Background
In February or March 2000, Gall entered
into an agreement with Luke Rinderknect
and others to distribute MDMA, also known
as ecstacy. Initially, Gall purchased 100
ecstasy tablets from Rinderknect on six
occasions between February and May 2000.
During this period, Gall traveled from Iowa
City, Iowa, to Pell. Iowa., to purchase
ecstasy from Rinderknect.
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In May 2000, Rinderknect decided to move
to Burbank, California. Before leaving Iowa,
he arranged a meeting with Gall and
Theodore Sauerberg to facilitate the ongoing
distribution of ecstasy in his absence.
During the meeting, the parties agreed that
Sauerberg would accept delivery of ecstasy
from Rinderknect and transfer the drugs to
Gall. When Gall received the drugs from
Sauerberg, he distributed them to other
individuals, including Ross Harbison, Jason
Story, Brooks Robinson, Mark Goodding,
and Corey Coleman. After receiving
payment from his customers, Gall delivered
the drug proceeds to Sauerberg. Sauerberg
then delivered the cash to Rinderknect.
One month after the initial meeting in Iowa
City, Rinderknect mailed a package
containing 5,000 tablets of ecstasy to
Sauerberg in Iowa City. Sauerberg then
distributed the ecstasy to Gall in 1,000 tablet
increments. Pursuant to the agreement, Gall
distributed the ecstasy to other individuals,
including Coleman who purchased a total of
1.500 to 2.000 tablets. Gall knew his
customers were redistributing the drugs
within the community. As the drugs were
distributed,. Gall paid Sauerberg for the
ecstasy. After Sauerberg collected the
$85,000 purchase price from Gall, he
contacted Rinderknect who flew to Iowa and
obtained the cash.
Approximately one to two months later,
Rinderknect mailed a second package
containing 5,000 tablets of ecstasy to
Sauerberg in Iowa City. Again, Sauerberg
distributed the ecstasy to Gall in 1,000 tablet
increments. After distributing the ecstasy,
Gall remitted $85,000 to Sauerberg, who
delivered the money to Rinderknect.
In September 2000, Gall decided to leave
the drug conspiracy. Rinderknect traveled to

Iowa City and met with Gall. Gall told
Rinderknect that he was getting out of the
drug business over concerns that Sauerberg
was telling too many people about their
ecstasy distribution business. Rinderknect
sold no more ecstasy to Gall as he requested.
According to Gall. he stopped selling
ecstasy in August 2000 when he moved in
with a new roommate and started studying
for his major at the University of Iowa.
Goodding testified that Gall stopped selling
ecstasy in August 2000 because he did not
like the trouble of having to deal with
people. Gall estimated that he made $30,000
while a member of the ecstasy conspiracy.
After college graduation in 2002, Gall
moved to Mesa, Arizona. Federal agents
approached Gall in Arizona, requesting to
speak with him about his involvement with
ecstasy sales while living in Iowa. Unknown
to Gall, law enforcement had already
arrested Rinderknect and Sauerberg, who
had implicated Gall. Gall admitted to the
agents his involvement in the conspiracy. In
2004, Gall was charged in an indictment
with conspiracy to distribute MDMA. Gall
made arrangements to return to Iowa from
his home in Winter Park, Colorado, when he
learned there was a federal arrest warrant
issued for him. Upon his return to Iowa, he
turned himself in to federal authorities.
Because Gall withdrew from the conspiracy
in September 2000, the parties stipulated
that the November 1, 1999 edition of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines applied
to Gall's offense conduct. The presentence
report ("PSR") assigned Gall responsibility
for 10,000 tablets of ecstasy. The parties
stipulated that for the purpose of calculating
a Guidelines sentence, Gall would be held
accountable for 2.500 grams of ecstasy, or
10,000 tablets, which under the 1999
Guidelines equals 87.5 kilograms of
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marijuana. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1,
87.5 kilograms of marijuana placed Gall at a
base offense level of 24. Because he
qualified for the safety valve pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, Gall's offense level was
reduced by two levels to 22. An additional
three-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility resulted in a total offense level
of 19.
Gall's criminal history included a conviction
for failure to maintain control of his vehicle
and underage alcohol possession in March
1997. As part of his sentence, Gall was
ordered to pay a fine and undergo treatment
for alcohol abuse. No criminal history points
were assessed for this conviction pursuant to
U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.2(c). Gall was also
convicted in December 1997 of improper
storage of a firearm on a public highway.
This conviction added one criminal history
point pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c).
Finally, in March 2000, Gall was convicted
of possession of marijuana for which he
received a deferred judgment; no criminal
history points were assigned to this
conviction. With a Category I criminal
history, Gall's advisory Guidelines range
was 30 to 37 months' imprisonment.
At Gall's sentencing hearing, his father,
Tom Gall, testified that he had observed a
change in his son's life and that his son had
started his own business and was doing well.
He added that contractors rely on his son for
expertise in installing windows. Finally, he
commented that his family would be
devastated if his son went to jail.
Gall's mother, Vicki Gall, testified that she
believed her son realizes that he made a
"stupid mistake" and that he has really
learned from it. She added that during the
last year, her son has become more mature.
She concluded by questioning the value of

incarcerating someone who had already
made positive changes in his life.
Gall's counsel requested a sentence of
probation, asserting that Gall was not in
need of rehabilitation because he had
already done an admirable job of
rehabilitating himself. His counsel noted
letters of support sent to the district court
sent by Gall's friends and family. In
addition, his counsel argued that a felony
conviction is a severe consequence that
would follow Gall throughout his life. Gall's
counsel distinguished Gall from the
codefendants who received prison sentences
by noting Gall's withdrawal from the
conspiracy and his assumption of a crimefree lifestyle. Counsel concluded his
remarks by reminding the court that Gall's
family, along with two contract employees,
"work pretty much exclusively for Mr. Gall"
and were depending on Gall.
The government requested a sentence of 30
months' imprisonment, a sentence at the low
end of the advisory Guidelines range. The
government argued this sentence was
appropriate,
considering
Gall already
received a significant benefit by being
sentenced under the 1999 Guidelines. In
1999, the Guidelines stated that 1 gram of
ecstasy equated to 35 grams of marijuana.
The current Guidelines equate 1 gram of
ecstasy to 500 grams of marijuana, which is
14 times the conversion quantity that Gall
faced. In addition, Gall's recommended
sentence only included drug quantities for
the period of his participation in the
conspiracy not foreseeable drug quantities
during the entire conspiracy. Also, Gall
benefited from a two-level safety-valve
reduction. Finally, the government argued
that a 30-month sentence was appropriate
because the other coconspirators also
received prison sentences.
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Before announcing its sentence, the district
court denied a defense request to depart
from the advisory Guidelines range based
upon aberrant behavior and extraordinary
acceptance of responsibility. The court
concluded that departure requests for
remorse, post-offense rehabilitation, and
voluntary cessation of criminal activity were
best considered within the confines of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).
After considering the Guidelines, the district
court stated, both at the hearing and in its
subsequent sentencing memorandum, that it
was going to impose a sentence other than
that contemplated by the Guidelines and
sentenced Gall to 36 months' probation. In
imposing the sentence of probation, the
court stated that it had considered the §
3553(a) factors. Particularly, the court stated
that it took into account "the defendant's
voluntary and explicit withdrawal from the
conspiracy in September of 2000; the
defendant's exemplary behavior while on
bond; the support manifested by family and
friends who have attested to the defendant's
character; the lack of criminal history,
especially a complete lack of any violent
criminal history; and the immaturity of the
defendant."

The district court sentenced Gall to a term of
36 months' probation as a reflection of "the
seriousness of joining a conspiracy to
distribute MDMA or Ecstacy." Recognizing
that probation is not recommended when the
Guidelines range falls outside of Zone A, the
district court concluded that probation was
nevertheless appropriate because Gall's
offense level was based "solely on drug
quantity." The court stated, "While not
denigrating the seriousness of the offense
conduct in this case, the Court finds the

offense level based solely upon drug
quantity does not adequately reflect the
offense conduct."
The government now appeals, arguing that
the sentence is unreasonable in light of all of
the § 3553(a) factors because the district
court (1) gave unreasonable weight to Gall's
withdrawal from the conspiracy; (2)
improperly relied on studies showing that
adolescents are less culpable for their
actions than adults; (3) gave unreasonable
weight to Gall's post-offense rehabilitation
and behavior while on pre-trial release; (4)
failed to acknowledge that Gall's lack of
criminal history was accounted for in the
Guidelines calculation; (5) incorrectly
concluded that a sentence of probation
reflects the seriousness of the offense; (6)
did not consider whether a sentence of
probation affords adequate deterrence to
future criminal conduct; and (7) did not
consider whether a sentence of probation
creates unwarranted sentencing disparities
among defendants with similar records who
committed similar crimes.
II. Discussion
"Under Booker. the sentencing guidelines
are no longer a mandatory regime. Instead.
the district court must take the advisory
guidelines into account together with other
sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)." United States v. Claiborne, 439
F.3d 479, 480 (8th Cir. 2006). To determine
the proper sentence, "the district court must
first calculate the applicable guidelines
sentencing range." Id. After calculating the
advisory Guidelines range, the district court
"may then impose a sentence outside the
range in order to 'tailor the sentence in light
of the other statutory concerns' in §
3553(a)." Id. (quoting United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46, 125 S.Ct.
340

738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005)).
In the present case, neither party challenges
the district court's determination of the
Guidelines sentencing range; therefore, "we
review the resulting
sentence
for
reasonableness, a standard akin to our
traditional review for abuse of discretion."
Id. at 481.
"We have determined that a sentence
imposed within the guidelines range is
presumptively reasonable." United States v.
Myers, 439 F.3d 415, 417 (8th Cir. 2006).
"While it does not follow that a sentence
outside
the
guidelines
range
is
unreasonable," a sentence outside of the
Guidelines range "'may be unreasonable if a
sentencing court fails to consider a relevant
factor that should have received significant
weight, gives significant weight to an
improper factor or irrelevant factor, or
considers only appropriate factors but
nevertheless commits a clear error of
judgment by arriving at a sentence that lies
outside the limited range of choice dictated
by the facts of the case."' Id. at 417-18
(quoting United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d
997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005)).
The district court must clearly explain why
it imposed a sentence outside of the
Guidelines range.
United States v.
Gatewood, 438 F.3d 894, 896 (8th Cir.
2006). While we do not require "a rote
recitation of each § 3553(a) factor," the
district court should explain why it varied
from the Guidelines and the extent of the
variance. Id. "'Sentences varying from the
guidelines range . .. are reasonable so long
as the judge offers appropriate justification

under the factors specified in 18 U.S.C.
3553(a). How compelling that justification
must be is proportional to the extent of the
difference between the advisory range and

the sentence imposed."' Claiborne, 439
F.3d. at 481 (quoting United States v.
Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 426-27 (7th Cir.
2005)). Therefore, "the farther the district
court varies from the presumptively
reasonable guidelines range, the more
compelling the justification based on the §
3553(a) factors must be." United States v.
McMannus, 436 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir.
2006).
Here, the district court imposed a sentence
of probation when the bottom of Gall's
advisory Guidelines range was 30 months'
incarceration. In essence, this amounts to a
100% downward variance, as Gall will not
serve any prison time. Such a variance is
extraordinary. "An extraordinary reduction
must be supported by extraordinary
circumstances." United States v. Dalton, 404
F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2005); see also
Claiborne, 439 F.3d at 481 (holding that the
district court's imposition of a 15-month
sentence when the Guidelines range was 37
to 46 months' imprisonment, a 60%
downward variance, was unreasonable). We
conclude that this extraordinary variance is
not
supported
by
extraordinary
justifications.
First, the district court gave too much weight
to Gall's withdrawal from the conspiracy
because the court failed to acknowledge the
significant benefit Gall received from being
subject to the 1999 Guidelines. Gall was
held responsible for 10,000 tablets of
MDMA at a conversion rate of 1 gram of
MDMA to 35 grams of marijuana, resulting
in a base offense level of 24. Under the
current Guidelines, however, Gall's base
offense level would have been 32 because 1
gram of MDMA equates to 500 grams of
marijuana. In addition, Gall was not held
accountable for quantities of ecstasy
distributed by other members of the
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conspiracy subsequent to his withdrawal.

Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. Gall could have
been held responsible for other members'
reasonably foreseeable acts. United States v.
Smith, 240 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 2001)
("A defendant convicted of conspiracy is
properly held accountable for all reasonably
foreseeable acts and omissions of any coconspirator taken in furtherance of the
conspiracy.").
Second, the district court gave significant
weight to an improper factor when it relied
on general studies showing persons under
the age of 18 display a lack of maturity,
which often results in impetuous and illconsidered actions. This general study,
however, does not explain how Gall's
specific behavior in the instant case was
impetuous or ill-considered. Furthermore,
Gall sold ecstacy as a 21-year-old adult, not
as an adolescent.
Third, the district court did not properly
weigh the seriousness of Gall's offense.
While the district court observed that Gall's
offense level did not adequately reflect the
offense conduct because it was based "solely
on drug quantity." the district court ignored
the serious health risks ecstasy poses.
Ecstasy causes increased body temperature,
which can lead to liver, kidney, and
cardiovascular system failure; increases in
heart rate and blood pressure; and severe
anxiety and depression, which can occur
days or weeks after taking ecstasy. National
Institute on Drug Abuse. (2003), at

www.nida.nih.gov/infofax/ecstasy.html (last
visited March 31, 2006). Gall sold 10,000
ecstasy pills during the time he participated
in the drug conspiracy. The potential harm
posed by this quantity of illegal drugs
should not be lightly discounted.
Fourth, the record does not show that the
district court considered whether a sentence
of probation would result in unwarranted
sentencing disparities. See 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(6). "Congress has made avoiding
unwarranted disparity a legislative priority."
United States v. Lazenby, 439 F.3d 928, 933
(8th Cir. 2006). Therefore, we find that the
district court failed to consider a relevant
factor that should have received significant
weight.
Finally, the district court placed too much
emphasis
on
Gall's
post-offense
rehabilitation. Even if Gall's rehabilitation
"is dramatic and hopefully permanent," a
sentence of probation for participating as a
middleman in a conspiracy distributing
10,000 tablets of ecstasy with a personal
profit of $30,000 "'lies outside the limited
range of choice dictated by the facts of the
case."' Id. (quoting Haack, 403 F.3d at
1004).
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the judgment of the district
court is REVERSED and the case is
REMANDED to the district court for
resentencing.
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"U.S. Supreme Court Picks Up Replacements
for St. Louis Man"
Daily Record (St. Louis, MO.)
June 12, 2007
Allison Retka
The U.S. Supreme Court has taken up
another Eighth Circuit case[, Gall i. U.S.,]
on federal sentencing guidelines after
dropping a St. Louis-based appeal when the
petitioner was shot and killed last month in
an attempted car theft. This new case, first
filed in the federal court in Des Moines,
Iowa, addresses a lenient sentence issued to
an Iowa university student who sold $30,000
in Ecstasy tablets as part of a statewide drug
ring. After considering his age-21 years
old-and his limited criminal history, the
district court gave Brian Michael Gall 38
months probation when federal guidelines
mandated a 30-month prison sentence. Also
on Monday, the nation's highest court took
up another case, Kimbrough vs. U.S., which
deals with the discrepancies in punishing
crack cocaine crimes under federal
sentencing guidelines. That these two cases
were taken up just a week after the court
dismissed a pending appeals case from
Mario Claiborne, a St. Louis man who was
fatally shot May 29 near Grand Boulevard,
is no accident, said Matthew Shors, a
Washington, D.C., attorney for the
American Civil Liberties Union. "Clearly
what happened . .. was the court decided in

light of Claiborne being dismissed to grant
both these cases," said Shors, who drafted
an amicus brief in Claiborne's case on
behalf of the ACLU. "They sound familiar
in a lot of ways. It's the question of what

kind of circumstances do you have to have
to justify extraordinary discrepancies from
the contemplated guidelines range." While a
decision on Claiborne's case was expected
sometime this month, neither Gall nor
Kimbrough will be considered by the
Supreme Court until the next term, which
starts Oct. 1. Prosecutors and criminal
defense attorneys took note of Claiborne's
appeal because the case addressed the ability
of a district judge to issue a substantially
lower sentence than federal sentencing
guidelines prescribe. The 8th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals disagreed with U.S. Judge
Carol E. Jackson when in 2005 she
sentenced Claiborne to 15 months in prison
for possession and intent to sell crack
cocaine, a sentence less than half the threeyear minimum of federal guidelines.
According to police reports, Claiborne was
shot at a BP gas station on South Grand
Boulevard after one of his companions left
his vehicle and drove off in a nearby truck
that had been left empty and idling. As the
companion fled in the truck and Claiborne
followed after in his own car, the truck's
owner opened fire on Claiborne's vehicle,
striking him in the back. Claiborne managed
to drive himself to Saint Louis University
Hospital, where he was pronounced dead at
3:15 a.m. on May 30. The U.S. Supreme
Court dismissed his case June 4.
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"A Possible Sentencing 'Safe Harbor'
in New Rulings"
The NationalLaw Journal
June 25, 2007
Marcia Coyle
WASHINGTON-If federal appeals courts
may now presume that a criminal sentence
falling within the advisory Federal
Sentencing Guidelines is reasonable, will
district
judges
abandon
new-found
sentencing discretion for the safe harbor of
the guidelines?
The U.S. Supreme Court on June 21 held
that federal appellate courts may apply a
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness to
a district court sentence within the
guidelines. Rita v. U.S., No. 06-5754.
The important question now, according to
sentencing scholars and practitioners, is how
district judges will view the decision when
imposing sentences.
The presumption is an appellate court
presumption, not a sentencing court
presumption, emphasized Justice Stephen G.
Breyer, who was writing for the 8-1
majority. Sentencing judges don't lose
discretion and should continue subjecting a
defendant's sentence to the "thorough
adversarial testing" demanded by federal
sentencing laws. he added.
But a dissenting Justice David H. Souter
countered, "What works on appeal
determines what works at trial." If the U.S.
Sentencing Commission's views are as
weighty as the majority says they are, he
added, "A trial judge will find it far easier to
make the appropriate findings and sentence
within the appropriate Guideline, than to go
through
the
unorthodox
factfinding

necessary to justify a sentence outside the
Guidelines range."
The Rita case, in which Victor Rita
challenged his 33-month guideline sentence
for perjury and obstruction of justice,
presented a question that had divided the
circuits since the justices' major sentencing
ruling in U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005).
In Booker, the high court held that the
mandatory federal guidelines violated the
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial and
ruled the guidelines to be only advisory. It
also held that appellate courts should review
of
a
standard
sentences
under
reasonableness.
After Booker, a number of circuits began to
apply a rigid presumption of reasonableness
to any sentence that fell within the guideline
range for that crime.
The Bush administration had argued that
seven circuits applied a presumption of
reasonableness, but none had ever held that
the presumption was a per se one requiring
adherence to the guidelines in every case.
The administration argued, and the high
court agreed, that there may be cases where
reliance on the guidelines is not reasonable.
Besides emphasizing that the presumption is
for appellate courts alone and is not a
binding presumption, Breyer also stressed
that there is no presumption
of
unreasonableness for sentences falling
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outside of the guideline range.
"The decision confirms, by my light, that the
guidelines provide a relatively safe harbor
for [district judges]," said Douglas Berman
of Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz
College of Law.
But although the decision offers a safe
harbor, it also suggests "the waters outside
of port are relatively calm for judges as
well," said Jeffrey Fisher of Stanford Law
School.
"The lesson today is that after Booker it's
OK if district courts want to give people
heavy sentences, and there's going to be
some deference to that whether the sentence

is suggested by the guidelines or other
reasons," said Fisher.
If a court wants to give a lower sentence, he
added, five justices suggest appellate courts
"better not mess with that unless they have
extremely good reason to do so." The
decision was "not the best we would have
hoped for," said Carmen Hernandez,
president-elect of the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers, "but it does
allow for the judge who wants to be a judge
and exercise judicial discretion to do the
right thing."

[The court will address these issues in Gall
v. United States.]
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Snyder v. Louisiana
(06-10119)

Ruling Below: State v. Snyder, No. 1998-KA-1078 (Supreme Court of Louisiana), cert granted,
Snyder v. Louisiana, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8326, June 25, 2007.
Petitioner Allen Snyder, a black man, was convicted and sentenced to death by an all-white jury
for the fatal stabbing of his wife's male companion. Prior to trial, the prosecutor reported to the
media that this was his "0. J. Simpson case." At trial, the prosecutor peremptorily struck all five
African-Americans who had survived cause challenges and then, over objection, urged the
resulting all-white jury to impose death because this case was like the 0. J. Simpson case, where
the defendant "got away with it." On initial review, a majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court
ignored probative evidence of discriminatory intent, including the prosecutor's 0. J. Simpson
remarks, denying Snyder's Batson claims. On remand, a bare majority adhered to its prior
holding, again disregarding substantial evidence establishing discriminatory intent, including the
prosecutor's references to the 0. J. Simpson case, the totality of strikes against AfricanAmerican jurors, and evidence showing a pattern of practice of race-based peremptory
challenges by the prosecutor's office. In addition, the majority imposed a new and higher burden
on Snyder, asserting that Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006), permitted reversal only if "a
reasonable fact-finder [would] necessarily conclude the prosecutor lied" about the reasons for his
strikes.
Questions Presented: (1) Did the majority below ignore the plain import of Miller-El by failing
to consider highly probative evidence of discriminatory intent, including the prosecutor's
repeated comparisons of this case to the 0. J. Simpson case, the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges to purge all African Americans from the jury, the prosecutor's disparate questioning
of white and black prospective jurors, and documented evidence of a pattern of practice by the
prosecutor's office to dilute minority presence in petit juries? (2) Did the majority err when it
imported into a direct appeal case the standard of review this Court applied in Rice v. Collins, an
AEDPA habeas case? (3) Did the majority err in refusing to consider the prosecutor's first two
suspicious strikes on the ground that defense counsel's failure to object could not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel because Batson error does not render the trial unfair or the
verdict suspect?

STATE of Louisiana
V.

Allen SNYDER

Supreme Court of Louisiana
Decided September 6, 2006
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
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WEIMER, J. Defendant was convicted of
first degree murder and sentenced to death.
On direct appeal. this court ultimately
affirmed
defendant's
conviction
and
sentence. Currently, the case is on remand
from the United States Supreme Court,
which directed that we again review
defendant's Batson claims, this time in light
of Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231. 125 S.

Ct. 2317, 162 L. Ed. 2d 196 (2005). After
reviewing defendant's Batson complaints
cumulatively in light of the entire record as
directed by Miller-El, we find the trial court
did not err in determining the venire persons
were not excused by the State in a racially
discriminatory manner. Therefore, for the
reasons that follow, the judgment affirming
defendant's conviction and sentence is
reinstated. . . .
. . . The Equal Protection Clause of the
United
States
Constitution prohibits
engaging in purposeful discrimination on the
grounds of race in the exercise of
peremptory challenges. Batson. The Miller-

El decision that forms the basis for this
remand was the third in a trilogy of Supreme
Court opinions related to the allegedly
discriminatory exercise of peremptory
challenges in criminal trials. The trilogy
presents a pendulous treatment by the Court
of the issue of the evidentiary burden placed
on a criminal defendant who claims that
equal protection has been denied through the
State's use of peremptory challenges to
exclude individuals from the petit jury on
the basis of race.
In Swain v. Alabama. the Supreme Court
recognized that a State's purposeful or
deliberate denial of participation as jurors on
account of race violates the Equal Protection
Clause.
Reviewing
the
"very
old
credentials" of the peremptory challenge
system, the Court noted the "long and

widely held belief that peremptory challenge
is a necessary part of trial by jury." The
majority of the
Court sought to
prosecutor's
both
the
accommodate
historical privilege of peremptory challenge
free of judicial control and the constitutional
prohibition on exclusion of persons from
jury service on account of race. Because the
State may not exercise its challenges in
contravention of the Equal Protection
Clause, the Court held it was impermissible
for a prosecutor to use challenges to exclude
African-Americans from the jury "for
reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of
the particular case on trial" or to deny to
them "the same right and opportunity to
participate in the administration of justice
enjoyed by the white population." Thus,
proof by a defendant that members of his
race were struck from his jury was
insufficient; a defendant's burden was to
show the circumstances under which
prosecutors were responsible for striking
minority jurors beyond the facts of a
particular case. Proof of repeated striking of
African-Americans over a number of cases
was necessary to establish a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.
Twenty-one years after Swain, the Court
swung the pendulum in the opposite
direction, finding that the evidentiary
formulation of Swain was inconsistent with
standards that had developed during those
years for assessing a prima facie case under
the Equal Protection Clause. In Batson v.
Kentucky, the Court called the Swain
requirement "a crippling burden of proof'
that had made prosecutors' peremptory
challenges
"largely
immune
from
constitutional scrutiny." The Court held that
a defendant could establish a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination in the
selection of the petit jury solely on evidence
concerning the prosecutor's exercise of
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peremptory challenges at the defendant's
trial. Evidence of a pre-existing pattern of
discrimination in previous cases was no
longer required.
Another 19 years later, in Miller-El, the
Supreme Court moved the pendulum back
toward middle ground. Stating that although
the move from Swain to Batson left a
defendant free to challenge the prosecution
without having to cast Swain's "wide net,"
the Court noted the net should not have been
consigned
to
history;
Batson's
individualized focus had an inherent
weakness of its own caused by its very
emphasis on the particular reasons a
prosecutor might give. "If any facially
neutral reason sufficed to answer a Batson
challenge, then Batson would not amount to
much more than Swain." Miller-El. Thus,
the Court reiterated-this time in a habeas
proceeding-Batson's explanation that a
defendant may rely on "all relevant
circumstances" to raise an inference of
purposeful discrimination. Id.
Nevertheless, the Court left the Batson test
intact in Miller-El and reaffirmed that
position in Rice v. Collins. Louisiana law
codifies the Batson ruling in LSA-C.Cr.P.
art. 795(C), which provides:
No peremptory challenge made by
the state or the defendant shall be
based solely upon the race of the
juror. If an objection is made that
the state or defense has excluded a
juror solely on the basis of race,
and a prima facie case supporting
that objection is made by the
objecting party, the court may
demand a satisfactory racially
neutral reason for the exercise of
the challenge, unless the court is
satisfied that such reason is
apparent from the voir dire

examination of the juror. Such
demand and disclosure, if required
by the court, shall be made outside
of the hearing of any juror or
prospective juror.
The race-neutral explanation need not be
persuasive or even plausible. Collins. It will
a
unless
race-neutral
deemed
be
discriminatory intent is inherent in the
explanation. The ultimate burden of
persuasion as to racial motivation rests with,
and never shifts from, the opponent of the
peremptory challenge. State v. Tyler The
trial court's findings with regard to a Batson
challenge are entitled to great deference on
appeal. When a defendant voices a Batson
objection to the State's exercise of a
peremptory challenge, the finding of the
absence of discriminatory intent depends
upon whether the trial court finds the
prosecutor's race-neutral explanations to be
credible. "Credibility can be measured by,
among other factors, the prosecutor's
demeanor; by how reasonable, or how
improbable, the explanations are; and by
whether the proffered rationale has some
basis in accepted trial strategy." Miller-El v.
Cockrell.
The three-step Batson process which guides
the courts' examination of peremptory
challenges for constitutional infirmities has
recently been described again by the
Supreme Court as follows:
A defendant's Batson challenge to
a peremptory strike requires a
three-step inquiry. First, the trial
court must determine whether the
defendant has made a prima facie
showing that the prosecutor
exercised a peremptory challenge
on the basis of race. Second, if the
showing is made, the burden shifts
to the prosecutor to present a race-
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neutral explanation for striking the
juror in question. Although the
prosecutor
must present
a
comprehensible reason, the second
step of this process does not
demand an explanation that is
persuasive, or even plausible; so
long as the reason is not inherently
discriminatory, it suffices. Third,
the court must then determine
whether the defendant has carried
his burden of proving purposeful
discrimination. This final step
involves
evaluating
the
persuasiveness of the justification
proffered by the prosecutor, but
the ultimate burden of persuasion
regarding racial motivation rests
with, and never shifts from, the
opponent of the strike. [Internal
quotations and citations omitted.]
The Court's decision in Miller-El v. Dretke,
a multifaceted and fact-bound opinion on the
merits of defendant's claim to habeas relief.
further clarifies the analysis to be used in
Batson's third and final step. Although the
case is a federal habeas case, it nevertheless
indicates the type of evidence to be
considered and the appropriate scope of an
evaluation of the prosecutor's reasons to be
applied by the trial court at the time a
Batson challenge is raised, which are later
pertinent to direct review by the appellate
courts.
The Miller-El opinion begins by recognizing
Batson's weakness is its "very emphasis on
the particular reasons a prosecutor might
give." Miller-El. The Court continued,
"Some stated reasons are false, and although
some false reasons are shown up within the
four corners of a given case, sometimes a
court may not be sure unless it looks beyond
the case at hand." Id. Miller-El, therefore,
redirects attention to "Batson's explanation

that a defendant may rely on 'all relevant
circumstances' to raise an inference of
purposeful discrimination," Id., and to the
trial judge's duty under Batson "to assess
the plausibility" of the prosecutor's
proffered reason for striking a potential juror
"in light of all evidence with a bearing on
it." (Emphasis supplied.) Id.
. . . After a detailed discussion of all the
evidence presented in support of defendant's
Batson challenge, the Court concluded that
the totality of the evidence showed the trial
court was unreasonable and erroneous in
determining the prosecutor's strikes of two
potential jurors were not racially motivated.
The Court summarized the myriad pieces of
evidence that together yielded its decision.
The Court found the existence of several
disturbing factors that together indicated the
prosecution's proffered race-neutral reasons
were mere pretext for discriminatory intent:
(1) the "bare statistics," which showed that
out of 20 black members of the 108-person
venire panel, only 1 served, Id.; (2) a
"comparative juror analysis," or a side-byside comparison, of some African-American
panelists who were struck and white
panelists who were allowed to serve, Id.; (3)
the "broader patterns of practice" that
occurred during jury selection, which
included inexplicable jury shuffling and
disparate questioning of African-American
and non-African-American panelists, Id.;
and (4) historical evidence that the particular
District Attorney's office involved in the
case had for decades followed a known,
formal, and specific policy of systematically
excluding African-Americans from juries.
The Court readily acknowledged that the
significance of some of the evidence of
discriminatory intent was "open to judgment
calls," but reasoned that when the evidence
was viewed cumulatively, it was "too
powerful to conclude anything but
discrimination.'

349

. . . [T]he Court's next Batson-third-step
case, Collins, illustrates the difficulties
courts face in attempting to review a trial
court's resolution of a Batson challenge. In
that case, a Batson challenge was made after
the prosecution struck a young, AfricanAmerican female panelist, and the challenge
was rejected by the state courts and the
federal district court. However, when
defendant sought collateral habeas corpus
relief in the federal courts, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed on grounds that
the trial court had acted unreasonably by
crediting the prosecutor's race-neutral
reasons for striking the juror. Collins v. Rice.
The Supreme Court reversed, finding the
Court of Appeals had "improperly
substituted its evaluation of the record for
that of the state trial court." Collins. The
Court found the record did not demonstrate
that a reasonable fact finder must necessarily
conclude the prosecutor lied about his
reasons for striking the panelist. Id.
at 975.

...

Application of Principles
Miller-El and Collins necessarily shape this
court's response to the Supreme Court's
present
remand
order
and
our
reconsideration of the Batson issue, but do
not require a detailed reconsideration of the
voir dire of the five African-American
prospective jurors peremptorily struck by
the State. As we stated in Snyder I, the
State's use of five of its peremptory
challenges to strike African-American
prospective jurors who survived challenges
for cause resulted in defendant's being tried
by an all-white jury. Now defendant reargues that the State's use of "close to half'
of its peremptory strikes to "exclude an
entire group comprising only fourteen
percent of the qualified pool" is compelling

evidence that the State's strikes were made
on the impermissible basis of race.
Considering this argument, this court's
current task is eased by an initial winnowing
out of some of the challenged jurors.
Currently, defense counsel makes no
argument with regard to Loretta Walker,
almost certainly because the record offers
for the
support
affirmative
ample
prosecutor's challenge.
With respect to two other prospective jurors,
Greg Scott and Thomas Hawkins, Jr., this
court previously found that the defendant
waived any Batson claim on appeal by
failing to object when the prosecutor struck
the jurors, although defense counsel noted
their race for the record. More importantly,
defense counsel did not ask the prosecutor to
articulate his race-neutral reasons for
excusing Greg Scott and Hawkins when the
Batson challenge was posed after the State
struck Elaine Scott from the third panel of
prospective jurors. Snyder. There is nothing
in Miller-El or Collins that casts doubt on
the correctness of this portion of Snyder I.
Despite defense counsel's reiteration of the
argument concerning the remaining two
potential jurors, we turn to our previous
decision regarding these persons:
Defense counsel did ... lodge the
proper Batson objections to the
of peremptory
use
State's
challenges against potential jurors
Jeffrey Brooks [and] Elaine Scott.
. . . The State originally accepted
Brooks as a juror, but later
backstruck him. The prosecutor's
reasons for striking Brooks were
that he appeared "very nervous"
throughout questioning and that he
would be missing class, as a
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student teacher, if chosen to serve
on the jury. The prosecutor stated,
"He's a student teacher. My main
concern is for that reason, that
being that he might, to go home
quickly, come back with guilty of
a lesser verdict so there wouldn't
be a penalty phase." Defense
counsel responded by stating:
His main problem yesterday was
the fact that he didn't know if he
would miss some teaching time as
a student teacher. The clerk called
the school and whoever it was and
the Dean said that wouldn't be a
problem. He was told that this
would go through the weekend,
and he expressed that that was his
only concern, that he didn't have
any other problems.

The trial court entertained the State s race
neutral reasons for the exclusions without
making a finding as to whether defendant
had made a prima facie showing of
purposeful racial discrimination. A trial
court's "demand that a prosecutor justify his
use of peremptory strikes is tantamount to a
finding that the defense has produced
enough evidence to support an inference of
discriminatory purpose." State of Louisiana
v. Green. Nevertheless, the issue of whether
the defense established a prima facie case of
discrimination is moot once the prosecutor
has offered a race-neutral explanation for the
peremptory challenge and the trial court has
ruled on the ultimate question of intentional
discrimination. Id.
Here, the trial court did not find that
defendant had established purposeful
discrimination and overruled the Batson
objections. These rulings appear correct.

As far as him looking nervous,
hell, everybody out here looks
nervous. I'm nervous.
The court allowed the State to exercise a
peremptory challenge on Brooks.
With respect to prospective juror Elaine
Scott, the district attorney excused her.
stating, "I observed she was very weak on
her ability to consider the imposition of the
death penalty. Her words. exactly-I wrote
it down. that she thinks she could, and that's
the reason for our challenge." However,
when asked again by the prosecution if she
could impose the death penalty. she
responded. "I could." She also responded
affirmatively when asked if she could listen
to the evidence and consider whether to
accept or reject the insanity defense and
hold the defense to its burden of proof.
Nevertheless, the trial court accepted the
State's explanation as race neutral and
excused Elaine Scott.

Although not required by the case law, the
State's proffered reasons were plausible,
supported by the record and race-neutral.
[Citations omitted.] The prosecutor's
reasons constituted "legitimate" grounds for
the exercise of a peremptory strike. [Citation
omitted.] None of the reasons articulated by
the State are readily associated with the
suspect class that is alleged to be the object
of the State's discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges. Defendant, the
opponent of the strikes, offered no facts or
circumstances supporting an inference that
the State exercised its strikes in a racially
discriminatory manner. Therefore, the
defendant's proof, when weighed against the
prosecutor's offered race-neutral reasons,
was not sufficient to prove the existence of
discriminatory intent.
After carefully reviewing the entire record
of voir dire, we find no abuse of discretion
or error by the trial court in its denial of
defendant's Batson claims. The trial court
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heard the prospective jurors and concluded
there were reasonable bases for the
challenges in question. The record does not
show that the State employed a tactic of
purposeful discrimination in its exercise of
peremptory challenges. [Record references
and footnote omitted.]
. . . At the beginning of the voir dire, the
trial court gave a brief explanation of the
jury selection process. The court announced
the eligibility requirements for jury service
and then asked the members of the venire
who had any basis for disqualification or a
significant reason that would warrant
excusal to approach the bench. Each venire
member approached the bench individually
and provided his or her reason for
ineligibility or for excusal. Some persons
were questioned further by the State or the
defense as to their reasons, and then the
court either excused them or denied their
requests.

During this preliminary voir dire process,
the State consistently inquired of a potential
juror whether or not his or her particular
problem would prevent concentration on the
evidence so as to impair the juror's decisionmaking task. For example, when speaking to
potential juror Chauffe, a single-mother of a
school-aged
child
who
claimed
transportation problems, the prosecutor
asked: "If you got selected on this jury
anyway, despite what you're telling us, do
you think that you would be able to pay
attention to the evidence in the case, and
listen to the Judge, and be a good juror? Or
do you feel you would be worrying too
much and not be able to listen to the
evidence?" When Chauffe answered the
second question affirmatively, the court
excused her. The prosecutor asked the same
type of question of prospective jurors
Pickett, Nguyen, Laws, Perkins, and Miller.

Later, when the State exercised a
peremptory challenge to backstrike Brooks,
the race-neutral reason given was the
prosecutor's reservations about this student
teacher's ability to consider the issues
without being distracted by his concerns
about school. This reason was consistent
with the concern voiced in the questioning
of other potential jurors during the pre-voir
dire process mentioned above.
Further, acknowledging that the peremptory
challenge of Brooks requires a more detailed
discussion than the challenge of Scott, we
note defense counsel's comparison of the
State's challenge of Brooks with the State's
acceptance of Yeager and Sandras, both
white males on the fifth panel. Yeager
expressed concern with jury service because
he had a commitment to an event scheduled
for Sunday that he had been an integral part
of for many years. Sandras reported he
taught at the University of New Orleans, had
just begun the semester, and would have a
problem with any "prolonged absence." We
note that both of these men were employed
and apparently already had established
careers; Brooks, on the other hand, was
attempting to complete his college courses
in order to begin a career in teaching.
The fact that Brooks actually approached the
bench on his own volition and raised his
teaching obligations as a hardship excuse
indicates he was truly concerned, more so
than Sandras and Yeager. When Brooks
approached the bench to raise a hardship
concern at the beginning of the jury
selection proceeding. Brooks stated to the
court that "there is something I'm missing
right now that will better me towards my
teaching career." On the other hand, Sandras
and Yeager merely responded to defense
counsel questioning posed to their panel
regarding any jurors' personal reasons or
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pre-existing obligations which would make
it difficult to concentrate or serve on the
jury. Thus, Brooks initiated the concern
about the trial being a hardship, while
Sandras and Yeager merely responded to
questions.
. . . There was no indication that race was
the underlying reason for backstriking
Brooks any more than race was a
consideration in the prosecutor's questions
to the other potential jurors...
The final part of our analysis is based on a
review of the record as a whole as instructed
by the Supreme Court in Miller-El ("[A]ll
relevant circumstances" and "all evidence
with a bearing" on the Batson issue must be
considered.) First, we consider the
proceeding at which the issue of racial
prejudice was raised prior to the beginning
of voir dire.
At a July 29, 1996 hearing to determine
whether the State would be permitted to
introduce at trial evidence of five incidents
of domestic violence allegedly committed
by defendant against his estranged wife to
show defendant's motive and intent, the
State made reference to "another case that
was on television everyday for the last
couple of years . . . where this very thing

happened." Thereafter, on August 16, 1996,
defense counsel filed a motion in limine
specifically requesting the State be
precluded at trial from referring to or
making comparisons with 0. J. Simpson or
his trial, as such references would serve no
purpose other than to confuse and prejudice
the jury. The prosecutor responded:
I think [the defense motion is]
premature. . . . I can assure the
Court that I'm not going to get up
in my opening voir dire and say
[that] "we're here for the Jefferson

Parish 0. J. Simpson .

.

. case." I

have no intentions of doing that. I
have no-perhaps in argument, I
don't know....
I have given the Court my word
that I will not, at any time during
the course of the taking of
evidence or before the jury in this
case, mention the 0. J. Simpson
case. . . . I just ask [the court] not
to grant this motion.
After the hearing, the trial court denied
on
the
defendant's
motion
based
prosecutor's representations.
Voir dire began against this backdrop on
August 27, 1996.
Next, we note that the State did, in fact,
make an indirect reference to the 0. J.
Simpson case during its rebuttal argument at
the penalty phase of the trial. ...
The portion of the State's rebuttal argument
that the defendant now complains about was
in direct response to the above quoted
argument. Specifically, the prosecutor
stated:
It's been very clear, and this is the
last thing I'm going to say about
Allen Snyder, that the kind of
person he is, as Mr. Olinde
described him in his opening
statement, he's egocentric, and he
has shown no remorse. More than
that, as he stabbed his wife 15
times, put her through what Dr.
Harkness described as a neardeath experience, as she lay there
gushing blood, as Mary Snyder sat
in that seat right there, he left her
there. He left her there to die. And
when Detective Labat took the
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statement from him 12 hours later,
.

.

. not a word at any time where

you would have heard him, how's
my wife? Is she okay? Not a word.
Is that because he's depressed or
because he's got a far deeper
problem? . . .
. . . However, other than suggesting
inferences to be drawn from the bare facts of
the prosecutor's remarks both prior to and
subsequent to the voir dire, defense counsel
points to no evidence in the record to
substantiate
defendant's
claim
of
discriminatory use of the peremptory
challenges. The inferences defense counsel
suggests are no more compelling than other
race neutral inferences to be drawn when
one considers the prosecutor's remarks in
context. The remark at the motion in limini
referred to the fact that the Simpson trial
involved alleged domestic violence; the
remark during rebuttal referred to the fact
that Simpson feigned suicidal intent. Neither
remark referred to Simpson's or Snyder's
race. Counsel's citations to authorities
concerning the Simpson trial never were,
and are not now, part of the record before
this court for review.
Miller-El directs that we cumulate all
relevant items tending to point to racial
discrimination and view them together when
considering whether the trial court's
determination
of the
existence
of
discrimination
is
clearly
erroneous.
Nevertheless, Miller-El directs that this
court examine the precise reasons given by
the State for its strike of Scott and Brooks.
This court cannot attempt to hypothesize
another reason that the State may have had
for its strikes. As stated by the Court. the
State must "stand or fall on the plausibility
of the reasons he gives." Miller-El.
Consequently, we find that when the entirety
of the record of defendant's case is

reviewed, the record shows that the
prosecution's stated reasons for striking
Scott and Brooks were not pretextual. A
review of this record compels a conclusion
that race did not play an impermissible role
in the exercise of these strikes.
When we view the totality of the evidence
discussed herein, as Miller-El directs,
despite the lack of the trial court's active
participation in voir dire and its failure to
articulate particularized reasons for its
determination that the State's proffered
reasons were not pretextual, we find the trial
court's decision to allow the strikes of Scott
and Brooks was not clearly erroneous.
Considering the evidence in the record
before us, a contrary conclusion would be an
improper substitution of this court's
evaluation for that of the trial court similar
to that struck down in Collins. The record
before us simply does not demonstrate that a
reasonable fact finder must necessarily
conclude the prosecutor lied about his
reasons for striking Scott or Brooks.
Applying

Miller-El

and

Collins,

the

prosecutor's demeanor was evaluated by the
trial court which found no discriminatory
intent. The explanations were reasonable
and the proffered rationale had some basis in
accepted trial strategy.
We conclude defendant did not carry his
ultimate burden of persuasion that the State
exercised peremptory challenges in a
purposefully discriminatory manner. We
reiterate that Snyder's "proof, when weighed
against the prosecutor's offered race-neutral
reasons, was not sufficient to prove the
existence of discriminatory intent." Snyder.
Accordingly, we reinstate the following
decree.
DECREE
In accordance with the above reasons
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assigned by this court, we unconditionally
affirm the judgment of the trial court and the
sentence of death. In the event this judgment
becomes final on direct review when either:
(1) the defendant fails to petition timely the
United States Supreme Court for certiorari;
or (2) that court denies his petition for
certiorari; and either (a) the defendant,
having filed for or and been denied
certiorari, fails to petition the United States
Supreme Court timely, under its prevailing
rules, for rehearing of denial of certiorari; or
(b) that court denies his petition for
rehearing, the trial judge shall, upon
receiving notice from this court under LSAC.Cr.P. art. 923 of finality of direct appeal,
and before signing the warrant of execution
as provided by LSA-R.S. 15:567(B),
immediately notify the Louisiana Indigent
Defense Assistance Board and provide the
Board with reasonable time in which: (1) to
enroll counsel to represent the defendant in
any state post-conviction proceedings, if
appropriate, pursuant to its authority under
LSA-R.S. 15:149.1; and (2) to litigate
expeditiously the claims raised in that
original application, if filed in the state
courts.
AFFIRMED.

KIMBALL, J. dissenting:
I believe that a review of the entirety of this
record performed using the vigorous
analysis directed by the Miller-El Court
reveals the trial court erred in allowing the

State to peremptorily challenge Mr. Brooks.
Consequently. I dissent from the majority's
conclusion that defendant did not prove the
State exercised peremptory challenges in a
purposefully discriminatory manner.

At the
outset, the raw numbers
characterizing the selection of defendant's
jury must be noted as they were in Miller-El.

The State used five of its peremptory
challenges to strike 100 percent of the
African-American prospective jurors who
survived challenges for cause. This resulted
in defendant being tried by an all-white jury.
Defendant argues that the State's use of
"close to half' of its peremptory strikes to
"exclude an entire group comprising only
fourteen percent of the qualified pool" is
compelling evidence that the State's strikes
were made on the impermissible basis of
race. While the fact that prosecutors used
their peremptory strikes to exclude 100
percent of the eligible African-American
panelists does not prove intentional racial
discrimination, Miller-El cautions that
"'[h]appenstance is unlikely to produce this
disparity."'
. . . Considering this injection of racial
issues, and the fact that the prejudicial
arguments were made to an all-white jury, I
believe it is only reasonable to conclude that
Mr. Brooks was peremptorily challenged by
the State on the basis of his race when the
entirety of the facts is considered. This is
especially true in light of the fact that the
trial court did not articulate its reasons for
overruling the Batson challenge. While one
may infer that the trial court found the
State's reasons credible, this court, on
appellate review, is not privy to the reasons
for this credibility detennination. One
simply cannot tell whether it was something
in the demeanor of the prosecution or in the
behavior or attitude of Mr. Brooks that
caused the trial court to believe the State's
race-neutral reasons were not pretextual.
The backstrike of Mr. Brooks followed the
Batson-challenged peremptory strike of Ms.
Scott, which had excluded the third of four
African-American panelists to be examined.
The State's backstrike of Mr. Brooks then
removed the only African-American juror
the State had accepted for service. With
these circumstances as a backdrop, which
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Miller-El teaches are clearly relevant to the
Batson analysis, the State's exercise of a
peremptory challenge is suspicious.
. . . It is possible the State had genuine
concern about Mr. Brooks's state of mind
despite his apparent acceptance of Dean
Tillman's assurances to the trial court.
Collins. However, there was no pre-strike
foreshadowing of genuine State concern
over the possibility of Mr. Brooks having
time-schedule anxieties. No attempt was
made by the State to verify its hypothesis
and develop an objective basis for its strike.
See Miller-El.
. . . In my view, the acknowledged time
concerns of Mr. Sandras and Mr. Yaeger
seem equally significant as the time
concerns attributed to Mr. Brooks. The
majority discounts the similarities among
these potential jurors by pointing out that
Mr. Brooks initiated the discussions
regarding his concerns about missing his
obligations, while Mr. Sandras and Mr.
Yeager merely responded to questions.
However, in no instance did the State
question Mr. Sandras or Mr. Yeager about
their admitted concern regarding the time
they would spend in court, and away from
their personal activities, if selected to serve
on the jury. The State chose to strike only
Mr. Brooks. in part because of his stated
concerns about missing a portion of his
student teaching duties. The similarities
among Mr. Brooks, Mr. Sandras, and Mr.
Yaeger, and the State's uneven treatment of
these panelists does not make the State's
proffered reasons for striking Mr. Brooks
per se pretextual. Both Mr. Sandras and Mr.
Yaeger may have exhibited legitimate traits
and qualities that made the State believe
they would make more desirable jurors than
Mr. Brooks. The factor that calls the State's
strike of Mr. Brooks into question is the

total lack of interest prosecutors exhibited in
the admitted time concerns of Mr. Brooks,
Mr. Sandras and Mr. Yaeger until it needed
to justify with race-neutral reasons its strike
of Mr. Brooks.
Miller-El directs that appellate courts
cumulate all relevant items tending to point
to purposeful discrimination and view them
together when considering whether the trial
court's determination of the existence of
purposeful
discrimination
is
clearly
erroneous. The record shows that issues of
racial prejudice existed at the outset of this
case when defendant attempted to foreclose
the possibility of the State mentioning the
0. J. Simpson trial during his own trial.
Defendant was tried by an all-white jury
after the State used five of its peremptory
strikes to challenge 100 percent of the
eligible African-American panelists. In the
absence of the trial court's independent and
objective assessment on the record of Mr.
Brooks's demeanor and attitude, the record
tends to belie the prosecutor's stated raceneutral reasons for striking him. Rather than
seeming uncertain and nervous, Mr. Brooks
appears from a reading of the cold transcript
to
be
engaged,
forthcoming
and
communicative. Additionally, although the
State offered the fact that Mr. Brooks might
want to manipulate his deliberation to cut
the trial short because of his stated concerns
about missing his student teacher duties as a
race-neutral reason for its strike, the State
did not ask Mr. Brooks one question
regarding this concern. Moreover, the State
accepted without question on the issue at
least two panelists who voiced similar
concerns and might conceivably have the
same motivation for cutting the trial short.
Finally, we note that the State injected race
into the proceedings directly when it did, in
fact, mention the 0. J. Simpson case during
its penalty phase argument over the
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defendant's objection.
When viewed in isolation, perhaps none of
the factors above would constitute enough
evidence to overturn the trial court's
determination in light of the great deference
afforded
its
factual
determinations.
However, the totality of the evidence
discussed herein, combined with the lack of
the trial court's active participation in voir
dire
and its failure
to articulate
particularized reasons for its determination
that the State's proffered reasons were not
pretextual, leads to the conclusion that the
trial court's decision to allow the strike of
Mr. Brooks was clearly erroneous. In my
view, the cumulative evidence of pretext is
compelling and too powerful to conclude
racial
intentional
but
anything
discrimination motivated the State's strike
of Mr. Brooks. Consequently, I would
reverse defendant's conviction and sentence.
JOHNSON, J. dissenting.:
When this case was first before this court on
original review in Snyder I I stated:
I would have more confidence in the fairmindedness of this jury and the jury's
pronouncement of the death sentence, had
the state not used its peremptory challenges
to exclude every African American juror,
resulting in an all white jury for this black
defendant. In my view. this violation of
Batson v. Kentucky, coupled with the
prosecutor's inflammatory and prejudicial
comparison of this case to the 0. J. Simpson
trial, require that we set aside the death
sentence and remand the case for resentencing.

selection process offends the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and a pattern of strikes against
African American jurors still gives rise to an
inference of discrimination. Once the
inference of discrimination is present, the
prosecutor then has the burden of
articulating a race-neutral explanation for
striking the African American jurors. The
trial judge serves as the gatekeeper, ensuring
that racial prejudice, which impedes the
securing of equal justice, does not invade
our judicial system. As the gatekeeper, the
trial judge must decide whether the
prosecutor has articulated a genuine
concern, or whether the reason articulated is
merely a guise to accomplish his/her
discriminatory purpose. Verbalized facially
neutral reasons can be a pretext for
conscious or unconscious racism.
In the present case, the prosecutor's action
in accepting the first African-American juror
seems to have been a tactic to keep defense
counsel from raising Batson challenges to
the subsequent exclusions. Nonetheless,
defense counsel noted in the record which
excluded jurors were African-American.
The Batson challenges to the remaining
three African-American jurors, including the
one juror who was accepted and later
backstruck, were overruled by the trial court.
The trial court accepted the prosecutor's
"race-neutral" explanations and the majority
found them to be "plausible, supported by
the record and race neutral."
The prosecutor's discriminatory intent in
excluding all African-Americans from the
jury was evidenced by his reference to the
0. J. Simpson trial during closing
arguments. In State v. Green, we recognized

The Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution gives a criminal defendant the
right to a trial by a jury of his peers. I still
believe that racial discrimination in the jury

that "for a Batson challenge to succeed, it is
not enough that a racially discriminatory
result be evidenced; rather, that result 'must
ultimately be traced to a racially
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discriminatory purpose."' Here we have a
racially discriminatory result. An all-white
jury selected by peremptorily excluding the
five African-Americans from the venire, and
the prosecutor's racially discriminatory
purpose of inflaming the jury by referring to
0. J. Simpson getting away with murder in
California.
Because of the nationwide media focus on
0. J. Simpson, the defense made a pre-trial
motion to exclude any references to the 0. J.
Simpson case. This motion was denied by
the trial judge based on the prosecutor's
assurance that he would not, at any time
during the course of taking evidence or
before the jury, mention the 0. J. Simpson
case. It is blatantly clear that the prosecutor
did not intend to keep his word. The
prosecutor had no need to make reference to
this defendant not getting away with murder
during the penalty phase of the trial. At this
point, the defendant had already been
convicted of the crime, so there was nothing
for him to "get away with." The prosecutor
utilized the 0. J. Simpson verdict to racially
inflame the jury's passion to sentence this
defendant to death. Such tactics leave no
doubt in my mind that the prosecutor had a
racially
discriminatory
purpose
for
excluding the Aflican-American jurors.
. . . The defendant's own confession, plus
the testimony of his ex-wife, Mary Snyder
who survived this brutal attack, along with
that of Gwen Williams, the witness who
came to the aid of Ms. Snyder during the
attack, support the defendant's conviction of
first-degree murder. The prosecutor's
improper
and
clearly
inflammatory
comments did, however, create a substantial
risk that the death penalty would be
imposed. In my opinion, the defendant's
death sentence should be set aside and this
matter remanded for re-sentencing.

The United States Supreme Court granted
defendant's writ of habeas corpus, vacated
the judgment of this court and remanded the
case to the Court to reconsider defendant's
Batson claims in light of its recent opinion
in Miller-El v. Dretke. In Miller-El, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that
racial discrimination by any state in jury
selection offends the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United
States Constitution. This rule is meant to
ferret out discrimination from our judicial
system. In this case, the majority's opinion
concludes that although the prosecution is
required by Batson to give race neutral
reasons for a peremptory challenge, the race
neutral reasons need not be persuasive or
even plausible. The trial court need only
find the prosecution's race neutral
explanations to be credible. They conclude
that the burden of proof never shifts from
the defendant who must prove the State's
discriminatory intent.
... In this case, the State used its seventh
peremptory challenge to back strike Jeffery
Brooks, who had initially been accepted in
the first panel of prospective jurors called
for examination. Upon the defense's
Batson's challenge to the State's later
backstrike of Mr. Brooks, the State
responded that Mr. Brooks was very
uncertain, and "looked nervous to me
throughout the questioning," and that Mr.
Brooks's concern about missing class as a
student teacher might lead him "to go home
quickly, come back with guilty of a lesser
verdict so there would not be a penalty
phase." The trial court allowed the
peremptory challenges without a ruling as to
whether the State's explanation was raceneutral or credible.
The Batson violations herein resulted in the
defendant being denied his right to be tried
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by a jury of his peers. In Snyder I, I was of
the opinion that these Batson violations
required a setting aside of the death penalty,
but not the conviction (guilt phase), since
the evidence seemed to be persuasive. Now,
I am of the opinion that these flagrant
Batson violations -require that the
defendant's conviction and sentence must be

set aside, and the case remanded for a new
trial. The defendant in a capital case is
entitled under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to an impartial jury in both the
guilt and the penalty phase.
For the aforementioned
respectfully, dissent.

reasons,

I
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"Batson and the '0. J. factor'
SCOTUSBiog.com
June 23, 2007
Lyle Denniston
WASHINGTON-For the second time in
two years, the Supreme Court is pondering
what to do about this scenario:
A black man is convicted of murder. His
trial is before an all-white jury, composed
that way in part because prosecutors struck
all potential black jurors.
In the penalty phase of the trial, the defense
counsel seeks to head off a death sentence
by discussing "mitigating circumstances."
When police arrived at the home of the
convicted man some 12 hours after the
murder, counsel said, the man "was curled
up in a fetal position. He was suicidal. He
kept saying 'They're coming to get me.
They're coming to get me.' . . . Doors were

being barricaded. The furniture was being
used as a barricade.

. .

. I'll ask you if that is

not suggestive of some sort of disturbance"
(apparently, meaning mental disturbance).
The prosecutor's rebuttal then includes the
following:
". . . it was 12 hours later when he called

[police], huddled up, claiming that he was
suicidal, barricaded himself in his house.
That made me think of something. Made me
think of another case, the most famous
murder case in the last, in probably recorded
history, that all of you all are aware of ...
.
At that point, the defense counsel objected.
After a bench conference, the prosecutor
continued: "The most famous murder
case

. .

happened in California very, very

very similar to this case. The perpetrator in
that case claimed that he was going to kill
himself as he drove in a Ford Bronco and

kept the police off of him, and you know
what, he got away with it. Ladies and
gentlemen, is it outside the realm of
possibility that that's not what that man [in
this case] was thinking about when he called
in and claimed that he was going to kill
himself?"
That is what the defense lawyer for Allen
Snyder, on death row in Louisiana, has
called "the 0. J. card," suggesting that it was
a calculated maneuver by the prosecutor to
use 0. J. Simpson's controversial acquittal
for murder to get an all-white jury in
Louisiana to give Snyder the death penalty.
Now, the Snyder case is back before the
Supreme Court, with the prospect that the
Court may act on his appeal as early as
Monday. The case, Snyder i. Louisiana
(06-10119). was considered by the Justices
at their Conference on Thursday. It reached
the Court in the context of a claim that the
jury that convicted Snyder of the stabbing
murder of his estranged wife s boyfriend
was all-white because prosecutors intended
it to be that way, and used their automatic
("peremptory") challenges to achieve that
end. Once having such a jury assembled, the
appeal argues. a prosecutor-who had
referred before trial to the case as his "0. J.
Simpson case"-knew the jury was open to
a racial plea for death.
The jury process, the appeal contends,
violated the Supreme Court's 1986 ruling in
Batson v. Kentucky, barring the use of racebased peremptory challenges in jury
selection. It also asserts that the Louisiana
Supreme Court did not follow the Supreme
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Court's post-Batson decision, Miller-El v.
Dretke in 2005. mandating a full analysis of
the circumstances of jury selection to detect
Batson violations.
But the case also raises, implicitly, the larger
question of whether prosecutors' references
to the 0. J. Simpson case, in trials involving
charges against blacks, are a form of jury
contamination that puts a vivid emphasis on
race in jury selection and in other phases of
the trial and sentencing.
State prosecutors, though, have urged the
Supreme Court to bypass the case, saying
that Snyder's lawyer did not preserve many
of the claims about a Batson violation, and
did not show that prosecutors in the case
were exploiting the race issue with the jury.
The state court, Louisiana's attorneys
contend, faithfully applied Batson and
Miller-El.
The case was before the Supreme Court in
the 2004-5 Term (docket 04-6530). On June
27. 2005, two weeks after the Court had
decided Miller-El, it vacated a prior (2004)
ruling against Snyder by the Louisiana
Supreme Court and told the state court to
apply the Miller-El ruling.
On reconsideration, the Louisiana court,
dividing 4-3 last September, applied MillerEl and once more upheld the conviction and
death sentence. As to "the 0. J. card"
allegation by defense counsel, the state court
said that "defense counsel points to no
evidence in the record to substantiate
defendant's claim of discriminatory use of
the peremptory challenges.

. .

. The remark

during rebuttal referred to the fact that
Simpson feigned suicidal intent," but did not
refer "to Simpson's or Snyder s race... A
reviewx of this record compels a conclusion
that race did not play an impermissible role
in the exercise of these strikes."

One of the dissenting state judges
prosecutor's
"the
of
complained
inflammatory and prejudicial comparison of
this case to the 0. J. Simpson trial." Two
others found prosecutors had injected "racial
issues" into the case, noting that the
prosecutor, before trial, had made a
reference to Simpson case, said when
challenged that he would not do so during
the trial, but then did so in rebuttal at the
penalty phase.
Snyder's new appeal to the Supreme Court,
filed by Marcia A. Widder of the Capital
Appeals Project in New Orleans, does not
rely solely on "the 0. J. card" question,
although it does put strong emphasis on that.
Other factors in claiming a Batson violation
were the facts of striking all five blacks on
the jury panel, different lines of questioning
white and blacks on the panel, and evidence
"showing a pattern or practice of race-based
peremptory challenges by the prosecutor's
office."
There were a total of nine blacks in the 85member jury pool from which the 12
members of the jury were chosen. Four were
removed for cause on prosecution motions,
and the remaining five were removed with
peremptory challenges. (After the jury of 12
had been selected, the state did not strike a
black woman who was chosen as an
alternate; the alternates were never used at
the trial.)
On a Batson-related issue, the appeal
contends that the state court imported into
its review of this case-a case on direct
appeal-a deferential standard that the
Supreme Court had laid down only in cases
involving federal habeas review of state
court decisions. The Louisiana court said it
could overturn the trial judge's findings of
no Batson violation based on the
prosecutor's race-neutral reasons for striking
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black jurors only by finding that the
prosecutor had lied about those reasons.
That would be improper second-guessing of
the trial court, the state supreme court said,
relying on the strong deference the Supreme
Court had commanded for habeas review in
Rice v. Collins in 2006.
Finally, the appeal challenges the state
court's refusal to consider in its Batson and
Miller-El analysis the prosecution's first two
strikes of black members of the pool
because the defense did not object at the
time. This failure, the appeal asserts, showed
that Snyder's trial lawyer was ineffective of
failing to raise an objection, but the state
court said such a failure to object on Batson
grounds is never prejudicial to the accused.
The appeal is supported by the Cornell Law
School Death Penalty Project and by the
Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers.

The Cornell brief argues that there is an
''ugly specter of racially motivated
resistance" by lower courts to the Supreme
Court's Miller-El decision. It accused the
Louisiana court of "recalcitrance," and
suggests it is "particularly shameful in light
and
deliberate
of the prosecutor's
premeditated racial purge of the jury, a
purge aimed at securing a receptive audience
for his racially inflammatory closing
argument."
The brief of the state criminal defense group
complains that the state's Supreme Court
has refused to find a Batson violation unless
a prosecutor concedes that the reason for
striking a juror was that he was a single
black male. "Nothing else has been
sufficient," it argues. In Jefferson Parish,
where the Snyder case originated,
"prosecutors strike black jurors at more than
three times the rate they strike white jurors,"
the defense group contends.
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"Court Rejects Rehearing for
Death Row Inmate"
Times-Picayune (New Orleans)
December 16, 2006
Paul Purpura
NEW ORLEANS-The state Supreme
Court. which has twice upheld a 1996 firstdegree murder conviction that sent a Kenner
man to death row, declined Friday to rehear
the case. [The U.S. Supreme Court later
agreed to hear the case, Snyder v.
Louisiana.]
Allen Snyder, 44, who is black, was
convicted by an all-white Jefferson Parish
jury of killing Harold Wilson, 29, of St.
Rose. Wilson was a companion of Snyder's
estranged wife, Mary Snyder, who was
slashed in the attack outside her mother's
River Ridge home in 1995.
In appeals, Snyder's attorneys argue that
Judge Kernan "Skip" Hand of the 24th
Judicial District Court in Gretna erred in
allowing then-prosecutor Jim Williams to
strike five black people from serving on the
jury.
That, Snyder's attorneys argued, meant he
didn't get a fair trial.
Racial discrimination has no place in jury
selection. according to a 1986 U.S. Supreme

Court ruling. Batson vs. Kentucky.
The state Supreme Court upheld the
conviction in 1999. But the U.S. Supreme
Court last year ordered the state's high court

to revisit the case and reconsider the role
race played during jury selection.
The nation's high court took the stance in
light of its ordering a new trial for Thomas
Miller-El, a black man who was convicted
and sentenced to die for killing a motel clerk
during a 1985 robbery in Texas. Black
potential jurors in Dallas County were
improperly kept off the trial jury in MillerEl's case, the court found.
Considering the Miller-El decision, the state
Supreme Court in September again upheld
the conviction by a 4-3 margin, finding there
was no error during jury selection. Chief
Justice Pascal Calogero and Associate
Justices Bernette Johnson and Catherine
Kimball dissented, saying Snyder deserves a
new trial.
Those same justices, ruling on a request by
Snyder's attorneys, on Friday said Snyder
should get a rehearing.
Jelpi Picou Jr., executive director of the
Louisiana Capital Appeals Project. which is
guiding Snyder's appeal, said they will now
consider taking the case to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
"We're certainly disappointed that the court
didn't grant a rehearing," Picou said.
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"Racial Currents May Drag Verdict Under"
Times-Picayune (New Orleans)
September 15, 2006
James Gill
NEW ORLEANS-Having engineered an
all-white jury for the murder trial of a black
man, then-Jefferson Parish assistant district
attorney Jim Williams drew an analogy with
the 0. J. Simpson case in his closing
remarks.
It was 1996, a year after a California jury
nullified Simpson out of the hoosegow.
Simpson "got away with it," Williams
declared, but Allen Snyder should be
executed. The jury voted as Williams urged.
The state Supreme Court last week and for
the second time decided that the prosecution
had no racial motive in rejecting all five
black members of the jury pool and then
dragging in Simpson as a bugaboo.
Kitty Kimball, Bernette Johnson and Chief
Justice Pascal Calogero came down
emphatically in favor of giving Snyder a
new trial, but their four brethren ruled that
Williams had "race-neutral" reasons for
comparing the two cases, since both
Simpson and Snyder were accused of wife
battering and both had purportedly
entertained suicidal thoughts as the cops
closed in.
Williams had not "referred to Simpson's or
Snyder's race," the majority noted. You
don't often find a line as funny as that in
Supreme Court opinions.
A jury would not have needed to be
particularly alert to identify the race of the
defendant sitting a few yards away. And
anyone who thought Orenthal J. Simpson

was white must have been living
extremely sheltered life for decades.

an

After 11 years as a star running back in the
NFL, Simpson remained in the public eye as
a sports announcer and movie star. He was
constantly seen on television running
through airports promoting rental cars and
even hosted Saturday Night Live.
Television
news
cameras
followed
Simpson's slow progress along the interstate
after the killing of his wife and her friend.
The arrest was covered by every media
outlet in Christendom, and millions watched
the trial live on television.
By 1996, there can't have been many people
in the white 'burbs who thought Simpson
innocent, and there can't have been any who
thought he was Caucasian. The furious
debate that followed his acquittal was
framed largely in racial terms.
In his career as a prosecutor-he has since
gone over to the defense side-Williams did
not pussyfoot around in seeking to put
defendants on death row and might not have
scrupled to mention race if he thought it
would help held his cause. But it wasn't
necessary, because the implication was
obvious, except to a majority of the state
Supreme Court.
Counsel in a criminal case can bump any
potential juror by way of "peremptory"
challenge so long as the motive is not to
exclude a racial group. That prosecutors
gave the heave-ho to all available blacks in
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this case does not prove an improper motive,
but it is bound to raise suspicions.
As the U.S. Supreme Court noted when
considering a racially skewed jury in a
Texas case, "Happenstance is unlikely to
The court
disparity."
produce this
overturned the conviction in that case, and
later ordered the Louisiana Supreme Court
to apply its reasoning to the Snyder appeal.
[The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the
cases, Snyder v. Louisiana.]

The state supremes did not take this as a
repudiation of their 1999 ruling against

Snyder and decided that the Texas case was
not sufficiently analogous to warrant a
change of heart. Barring a rehearing at the
state level, which would seem unlikely to
produce a different result, Snyder's
attorneys will hope the big suprernes see
things their way.
If that happens, prosecutors so many years
later will have a harder job proving their
case. If Snyder did indeed injure his wife
and kill her companion, as the evidence
would appear to suggest, a retrial will serve
as a reminder that playing by the rules is
ultimately in everyone's interest.
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"Court Ordered to Revisit Ruling"
Times-Picayune (New Orleans)
July 2, 2005
Paul Purpura
NEW ORLEANS-The U.S. Supreme
Court has ordered Louisiana's high court to
revisit its 1999 decision to uphold a murder
conviction that sent a black Kenner man to
death row, saying the state's justices should
reconsider their finding that race had no role
during jury selection.

which do not require a reason for removing
the person from the jury pool.

In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's June 13
decision that overturned a black Texas
man's murder conviction and death sentence
because prosecutors struck nearly all
African-Americans from the jury, justices
Monday ordered the Louisiana court to
reconsider Allen Snyder's case. [The U.S.
Supreme Court later agreed to hear the case.

Two weeks ago, the U.S. Supreme Court
restated its Batson ruling in deciding that
Thomas Miller-El should get a new trial on
grounds that Dallas County, Texas,
prosecutors improperly excluded black
people from the jury that convicted him of
murdering a hotel clerk during a robbery in
1985. Miller-El was sent to death row.

But under a 1986 U.S. Supreme Court
ruling, Batson v. Kentucky, lawyers are not
allowed to exclude people from a jury
because of their race.

Snyder v. Louisiana.]

Snyder, 43, was convicted of first-degree
murder in August 1996 by an all-white
Jefferson Parish jury that also recommended
the death penalty. He was found guilty of
repeatedly slashing his estranged wife, Mary
Snyder. and another man, Harold Wilson,
with a knife when he found them in a car
outside her mother's River Ridge home in
August 1995. His wife survived, but Wilson
died.
Snyder's attorneys since his trial have
sought to have the conviction overturned, in
part because they claim Jefferson Parish
prosecutors were racially driven during jury
selection, court records show.
Attorneys are allowed to remove potential
jurors "for cause," such as a juror knowing a
witness in the case. The attorneys also are
allowed peremptory challenges, or strikes,

Conn Regan, chief of trials for the Jefferson
Parish district attorney's office, declined to
comment. "We haven't seen the opinion," he
said.
Although the cases are different, the timing
of the high court's ruling in the Miller-El
case boded well for Snyder. said his
attorney, Marcia Widder of the Capital
Appeals Project in New Orleans.
"In Miller-El, the United States Supreme
Court explained that Batson claims must be
closely scrutinized by both the trial court
and the appeal courts," Widder said. "That
was not done in Mr. Snyder's case."
The nation's high court wants the Louisiana
Supreme Court to reconsider Snyder's case
on the Batson issues, Widder said. "The
Louisiana Supreme Court in turn may either
decide the issue itself or send the case back
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to the trial court for further proceedings,"
she said.
The ruling does not remove Snyder from
death row, Widder said. But Snyder should
get a new trial if a court rules that the Batson
ruling was violated, she said.
It is unclear when the state Supreme Court
will revisit the case.
This would be the third time the state's high
court has dealt with Snyder's case and the
second time it has wrangled with Batson
allegations. Recently, the high court rejected
a defense appeal claiming Snyder was not
mentally competent to stand trial.
But the Louisiana Supreme Court's action in
question this week is based on its April 1999
ruling in which a majority of justices
rejected the defense argument that 24th
Judicial District Judge Keman "Skip" Hand
erred in allowing then-prosecutor Jim
Williams to strike African-Americans from
the jury.
The Jefferson Parish district attorney's
office two years ago was accused of
systematically excluding blacks from juries
by the Louisiana Crisis Assistance Center, a
charge that District Attorney Paul Connick
Jr. refuted as a politically motivated attack
on his office by a defense lawyers group

opposed to the death penalty.
In Snyder's case, his lawyers have said
prosecutors used peremptory challenges to
strike all five black people who were not cut
for cause.
In its 1999 majority opinion, the Louisiana
Supreme Court said Hand's rulings on
Batson issues during jury selection "appear
correct" and that Snyder's attorney at trial
did not challenge all of Williams' strikes on
whether they were racially neutral.
But Justice Bemette Johnson and former
Justice Harry Lemmon dissented.
Johnson said Snyder's death sentence should
have been set aside because of the jury
selection issue and because Williams, during
the trial, compared the Snyder case to 0. J.
Simpson's murder acquittal and urged the
jury to not let Snyder "get away with it."
Johnson
called
Williams'
words
"inflammatory and prejudicial."
Simpson was acquitted in October 1995 of
murdering his wife and another man.
Lemmon wrote in his dissenting opinion that
the "racial bias overtones of the entirety of
this rather simple trial require reversal of the
conviction and sentence of a black defendant
tried by an all-white jury."
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"Killer Gets Death in Slashing"
Times-Picayne (New Orleans)
August 23, 1997
Joe Darby
Nearly a year after a Jefferson Parish jury
ordered Allen Snyder sentenced to death for
first-degree murder, his sentence was
imposed Friday.
Snyder was convicted and condemned to
death Aug. 30 for the slashing death of
Harold Wilson, 29, of St. Rose, a companion
of Snyder's estranged wife.
Snyder, 35, of Kenner, was represented by
public defenders during his trial, but after
his conviction he hired Marion Farmer, a
former St. Tammany Parish district attorney,
to represent him. Farmer filed a motion for a
new trial, but the hearing had been put off
10 times at the defense's request.
After hearing Farmer's motions for a new
trial Friday, Judge Kernan "Skip" Hand of
the 24th Judicial District Court denied his
request and sentenced Snyder to die by
lethal injection. Snyder made no statement
before sentencing.
Farmer said he will appeal Hand's decision
to the state Supreme Court. Additionally, all
death penalty cases are automatically put on
appeal.
Farmer claimed that in his 30 years of law
practice, he had never seen so many
reversible errors in a murder case.
Among his contentions were claims that the
indigent-defender attorneys had not had
sufficient time to prepare their case, that the
question of Snyder's mental state was not
sufficiently raised at trial, and that a bloody
photo of the victim, as well as old photos of

Snyder in martial arts outfits, inflamed
jurors.
Farmer also said that prosecutors excluded
all black people from the jury, resulting in
an all-white jury that would likely be more
prejudicial against Snyder, who is black.
He said the jury was unnecessarily inflamed
again when prosecutor Jim Williams
compared Snyder's case to that of 0. J.
Simpson.
Evidence showed that on Aug. 16, 1995,
Snyder lurked in the bushes outside the
Metairie home of the mother of Mary
Snyder, his estranged wife. He waited until
Wilson and Snyder drove up, then charged
the car, slashing Wilson to death and
severely cutting his wife, testimony showed.
Prosecutor Donnie Rowan said that the
defense had time to prepare its case, that
several doctors had found that Snyder was
mentally able to stand trial and that the state
has a right to show graphic photos that
depict the defendant's intent to kill.
Rowan also said there were legitimate
comparisons between Snyder's case and that
of Simpson.
Hand ruled that the prosecution had given
sufficiently racially neutral reasons for
excluding black potential jurors. In selecting
a jury, attorneys strike jurors who they feel
may not be favorable to their side, in
confidential conferences at the judge's
bench.
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"Man Gets Death Penalty"
Times-Picayune (New Orleans)
August 31, 1996
Joe Darby
NEW ORLEANS-The Jefferson Parish
jury that convicted Allen Snyder of firstdegree murder decided Friday that he should
die for the slashing death of a 29-year-old
St. Rose man.
Harold Wilson was stabbed numerous times
as he sat with Snyder's estranged wife in his
car on Wicker Neal Street in River Ridge on
Aug. 16, 1995. Snyder also badly cut his
wife, Mary Snyder, in the attack.
Judge Kernan "Skip" Hand will sentence
Snyder Sept. 16.
Wilson's wife, Dorena Wilson, told jurors
her husband was a good man, a loving father
and a hard worker who built up his own
business, a flooring company.
"My son still asks for his daddy every day,"
she said of her 4-year-old boy. "I tell him his
daddy is in heaven, but he asks me when
daddy will come down and play with him."
Howard Moore, Wilson's father, said he
could not describe the pain that his son's
murder has brought to his family. "Our
family is like one," he said. "Howard was
not just a son, he was my best friend."
Defense attorney Cesar Vasquez put on the
stand relatives, friends and a former
employer of Snyder's who testified that until
the defendant lost control of his life because
of his wife's alleged infidelity, he had been
a good family man who cherished his
children.
However, evidence showed that Snyder had

pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution
of cocaine in St. Charles Parish in 1989.
Prosecutors also provided testimony that
Snyder had severely abused his estranged
wife for several months prior to the
stabbings, after he had found out that she
was seeing someone else, a man who later
moved to Houston.
Mary Snyder had gone out with Wilson for
the first time on the night of the killing, she
said, but was not romantically involved with
him. Snyder, who an eyewitness said had
been lying in wait with his knife outside
Mary Snyder's mother's house, rushed upon
Wilson and Mary Snyder after they drove up
and parked some time after midnight,
evidence showed.
Dr. Sara Deland, a forensic psychiatrist
testifying for the defense, said Snyder was
suffering from a major depression in the
weeks before the killing, but under cross
examination said there is no direct link
between depression and criminal acts of
violence.
Expert witnesses for the state, psychologist
Thomas Hannie Jr. and Dr. Robert Davis, a
forensic psychiatrist, both testified that
Snyder has refused to accept responsibility
for his actions and blames others for his
troubles.
Vasquez asked the jury to recommend a
sentence of life in prison. saying that would
be sufficient punishment because he would
wake up every day in Angola thinking about
the consequences of his actions. Vasquez
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said Snyder had cracked because he was
working 12 hours a night to support his
family while his wife was having an affair.
Prosecutor Jim Williams countered that the
members of Wilson's family are the ones

serving a life sentence. "They will wake up
every day knowing that their son, their
brother, their husband, was brutally
murdered. Instead of worrying about his
killer, look at what his actions did to the
lives of other people."
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Danforth v. Minnesota
(06-8273)

Ruling Below: Danforth v. State, No. A04-1993 (Supreme Court of Minnesota), cert granted,
Danforth v. Minnesota, 2006 Minn. LEXIS 506, May 21, 2007.
Danforth, in jail for sexually abusing a child, filed multiple petitions for postconviction relief,
alleging he was entitled to relief based on the rules established by subsequent cases. Danforth
seeks to retroactively apply those rules to the case at point.
Questions Presented: (1) Are state supreme courts required to use the standard announced in
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), to determine whether United States Supreme Court
decisions apply retroactively to state-court criminal cases, or may a state court apply state-lawor state-constitution-based retroactivity tests that afford application of Supreme Court decisions
to a broader class of criminal defendants than the class defined by Teague? (2) Did Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), announce a "new rule of constitutional criminal procedure," as
Teague defines that phrase and, if it did, was it a watershed rule of procedure subject to full
retroactive application?

Stephen DANFORTH,
Petitioner-Appellant
V.

STATE of Minnesota,
Respondent

Supreme Court of Minnesota
Decided July 17, 2006
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
Heard, considered, and decided by the court
en banc.
ANDERSON, G. Barry, Justice:
Stephen Danforth was convicted of firstdegree criminal sexual conduct, Minn. Stat. §
609.342. subd. 1(a) (2004). on March 6, 1996.
This conviction arose out of the sexual abuse
of J.S., a 6-year-old boy. J.S. was found
incompetent to testify at trial, but a
videotaped interview of J.S. conducted at a
non-profit center was admitted into evidence.

On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed
Danforth's conviction but remanded for
resentencing. State v. Danforth, 573 N.W.2d
369, 371 (Minn. App. 1997) (Danforth1), rev.
denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1998). On remand,
Danforth was sentenced to imprisonment for
316 months. The court of appeals affirmed
this sentence on appeal. State v. Danforth,
1999 Minn. App. LEXIS 462, No. C5-982054, 1999 WL 262143, at *1 (Minn. App.
May 4. 1999) (Danforth II). rev. denied
(Minn. July 28, 1999). Alleging various trial
errors, Danforth filed a petition for
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postconviction relief The postconviction
court denied the petition and the court of
appeals affirmed. Danforth v. State, 2001
Minn. LEXIS 95. No. C6-00-699, 2000 WL
1780244, at *1 (Minn. App. Dec. 5, 2000)
(Danforth 11), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 13,
2001).
After the Supreme Court's decisions in
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.
Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). and
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.
Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), Danforth
filed a second petition for postconviction

relief alleging he was entitled to relief based
on the rules established by those cases. The
postconviction court denied Danforth relief,
finding that neither Crawford nor Blakely
applied retroactively to Danforth's case; the
court of appeals affirmed. Danforth v. State.
700 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Minn. App. 2005)

(Danforth IV). We granted review of the
Craisford issue only and requested that the

Office of the State Public Defender represent
Danforth on this appeal.
Danforth argues that this court is free to apply
a broader retroactivity standard than that of
Teague v. Lane. 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct.
1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989). and that he is
entitled to the benefit of Crawford under state
retroactivity principles. He also argues that,
even using the framework of Teague,
Crawford should be retroactively applied to
his case. We reaffirm our holding in State v.
Houston. 702 N.W.2d 268, 270 (Minn. 2005),
that we are required to apply Teague's
principles when analyzing the retroactivity of
a rule of federal constitutional criminal
procedure. Because we conclude that, under
apply
not
Crawiford does
Teague,
retroactively to Danforth's case, we affirm.
I.

We recently held that

the retroactivity

principles of Teague control
when
determining the retroactive effect of a federal
constitutional rule of criminal procedure.
Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270. Under Teague,
a new rule is usually not retroactively
applicable to a defendant's case once the
defendant's case has become final. Teague,
489 U.S. at 310 (plurality opinion). It is
undisputed that Danforth's case was final
before Craisfordwas decided.
For the first time in his brief to this court,
Danforth argues that this court is free to apply
a broader retroactivity standard than that in
Teague and that he is entitled to the benefit of
Crawford under state retroactivity principles.
We choose to address this issue in the
interests of justice.
We have stated that, when dealing with a new
rule of federal constitutional criminal
procedure, we are "compelled to follow the
lead of the Supreme Court in determining
when a decision is to be afforded retroactive
treatment." O'Meara v. State, 679 N.W.2d
334, 339 (Minn. 2004). This conclusion is
based on American Trucking Associations,
Inc. v. Smith, in which a plurality of the
Supreme Court stated that the retroactive
effect of its federal constitutional decisions is
a question of federal law and that the Court
has "consistently required that state courts
adhere to [the Court's] retroactivity
decisions." 496 U.S. 167, 177-78, 110 S. Ct.
2323. 110 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990) (plurality
opinion); see also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl,
497 U.S. 916, 918. 110 S. Ct. 3202, 111 L.
Ed. 2d 734 (1990). In Houston, we applied
O'Meara's principles to hold that we must
follow the Teague framework when
determining
whether a postconviction
petitioner is entitled to have a new rule of
federal constitutional criminal procedure
applied retroactively to his or her case.
Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270. Minnesota is
not the only state to have determined that a
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Teague analysis is required when determining
whether a new rule of federal constitutional
criminal
procedure
can
be
applied
retroactively to cases on state postconviction
review. See Page v. Palmateer,336 Ore. 379,
84 P.3d 133, 134-38 (Or. 2004).
Danforth argues that Teague dictates the
limits of retroactive application of new rules
only in federal habeas corpus proceedings and
does not limit the retroactive application of
new rules in state postconviction proceedings.
Danforth is incorrect when he asserts that
state courts are free to give a Supreme Court
decision of federal constitutional criminal
procedure broader retroactive application than
that given by the Supreme Court. In American
Trucking Associations, the plurality rested its
retroactivity analysis in part on Michigan v.
Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 93 S. Ct. 1966, 36 L. Ed.

As to convictions that are already final,
however, the rule applies only in limited
circumstances." (citation omitted) (emphasis
added)). Once a case is "final," a new rule of
federal constitutional criminal procedure can
be retroactively applied to the case only if
retroactive application is warranted under the
Teague framework. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 35152. The Court, therefore, has created a
retroactivity framework with only two
procedural categories of cases: (1) those on
direct review and (2) those that are final.
Since we have already concluded that a
petition for postconviction relief does not
constitute "direct review," see Houston, 702
N.W.2d at 270, and it is undisputed that
Danforth's case was final at the time of the
Crawford decision, we must apply Teague
when determining whether Crawford can be
retroactively applied to Danforth's case.

2d 736 (1973). Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 496

U.S. at 178. In Payne, the Court reversed the
decision of the Michigan Supreme Court,
which had applied North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d

656 (1969). retroactively to Payne's case, and
held that Pearce would not apply to errors
occurring before Pearce was decided. Payne,
412 U.S. 49, 57, 36 L. Ed. 2d 736.

We are aware that other states have declined
to apply Teague or have emphasized that they
apply Teague as a matter of choice when
determining the retroactivity of new rules of
federal constitutional criminal procedure in
state postconviction proceedings. See Daniels
v. State, 561 N.E.2d 487, 489 (Ind. 1990);
State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley. 606 So. 2d
1292, 1296-97 (La. 1992); State v. Whitfield,

In light of Payne and American Trucking

107 S.W.3d 253, 266-68 (Mo. 2003); Colwell

Associations, we cannot apply state
retroactivity principles when determining the

v. State. 118 Nev. 807, 59 P.3d 463, 470-71
(Nev. 2002); Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d

retroactivity of a new rule of federal
constitutional criminal procedure if the

514. 517-18 (S.D. 1990). The principal
rationales given in these decisions are: (1) a
state may give a new rule of federal
constitutional criminal procedure greater
retroactive effect than that given by the
Supreme Court and (2) state postconviction
proceedings involve different interests than
federal habeas proceedings. See Whitfield.
107 S.W.3d at 267-68; Colwell, 59 P.3d at

Supreme Court has already provided relevant
federal principles. While the Supreme Court
has not explicitly addressed retroactivity
principles in state postconviction proceedings,
the Court has drawn a line between cases that

are "pending on direct review," and cases that
are "final." See Schriro v. Sunimerlin, 542
U.S. 348, 351, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 159 L. Ed. 2d
442 (2004) ("When a decision of this Court

results in a 'new rule,' that rule applies to all
criminal cases still pending on direct review.

470-71:

Cowell. 458 N.W.2d at

517-18.

Teague's framework is based, in part, on
concerns unique to federal habeas corpus
decisions. See Teague. 489 U.S. at 308
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("[W]e have recognized that interests of
comity and finality must also be considered in
determining the proper scope of habeas
review." (emphasis added)). Notwithstanding
these different policy concerns, in light of
Payne, American Trucking Associations, and
the dichotomy drawn by Teague between
cases on "direct review" and "final" cases, we
reaffirm our decision in Houston and
conclude that we are not free to fashion our
own standard of retroactivity for Crawford.
Therefore, the retroactivity of Crawford to
Danforth's case must be analyzed under
Teague.
II.
Danforth argues that, even using a Teague
analysis, Crawford applies retroactively to his
case because: (1) Craw~ford did not announce
a "new" rule and, alternatively, (2) Crawford
established a "watershed rule" of criminal
procedure and therefore is fully retroactive
under an exception to Teague's general rule.
Whether Crawford applies retroactively to
cases final at the time Crawiford was decided
is a purely legal issue reviewed de novo. See
Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270. We address
each of Danforth's arguments in turn.
A.
Under Teague, we inquire "whether the rule
of federal constitutional criminal procedure is
new, or whether it is merely a predictable
extension of a pre-existing doctrine."
Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270. If the rule is
"new." it generally will not be applicable to
cases that became final before the rule was
announced. Teague. 489 U.S. at 310.
Danforth argues that Cratford did not
announce a new rule of constitutional
procedure but that Craiford's decision was
"dictated by precedent dating back to the
1800s." The state, citing the decisions of
several federal circuit courts on this issue,

argues that holding that Crawford established
a new rule is the better-reasoned position.
Crawford's "holding constitutes a 'new rule'
within the meaning of Teague if it 'breaks
new ground,' 'imposes a new obligation on
the States or the Federal Government,' or was
not 'dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant's conviction became final."'
See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467,
113 S. Ct. 892, 122 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1993)
(quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301). Teague's
limit on the retroactivity of new rules of
"validates
procedure
constitutional
reasonable, good-faith interpretations of
existing precedents made by state courts even
though they are shown to be contrary to later
decisions." Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407,
414, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 108 L. Ed. 2d 347
(1990). As we have stated, the test to
determine whether a rule of procedure is
"new" for Teague purposes is not whether the
rule "is logically an extension of some
precedent," but rather "whether 'reasonable
jurists hearing petitioner's claim at the time
his conviction became final would have felt
compelled by existing precedent to rule in his
favor."' Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 271 (quoting
Graham, 506 U.S. at 467) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation omitted)). This test is
meant "to ensure that gradual developments
in the law over which reasonable jurists may
disagree are not later used to upset the finality
of state convictions valid when entered."
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227. 234, 110 S.
Ct. 2822, 111 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1990).
Applying these principles to this case, we
examine the change Crawford worked on the
legal landscape. As we have stated, prior to
Cra4ford,the admissibility of an out-of-court
statement under the Confrontation Clause was
guided by Ohio v.Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100
S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980),
abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.
Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 See State v.
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Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Minn.
2006). Under Roberts, a hearsay statement
could be admitted without violating a
defendant's rights under the Confrontation
Clause if: (1) the declarant was unavailable at
trial and (2) the statement bore "adequate
'indicia of reliability."' 448 U.S. at 66.
Sufficient reliability was inferred when the
evidence fell "within a finmly rooted hearsay
exception." Id. If the evidence did not fall
within such an exception, it was only
admissible upon "a showing of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness." Id.
Cravwford "significantly altered the rules
governing the admissibility of testimonial outof-court
statements
against
criminal
defendants at trial." Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802
at 808. Stating that the Roberts test had a
"demonstrated capacity" to admit statements
in contravention of the Confrontation Clause,
the Supreme Court held that "testimonial"
evidence is inadmissible unless the. witness is
unavailable and the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the witness. See
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54, 63. 68. The
Court declined to provide a complete
definition of "testimonial," but stated that the
term covered, "at a minimum, prior testimony
at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury,
or at a former trial [,] and police
interrogations." Id. at 68.
The rule in Crawford. therefore. was not
compelled by Roberts-Crawford replaced
the more flexible reliability inquiry of Roberts
with a bright-line rule for a certain class of
hearsay statements. Nonetheless, Danforth
argues that Crawford did not announce a new
rule because "the Supreme Court has always
held that testimonial statements made without
cross-examination were inadmissible under
the Confrontation Clause." This argument
rests on the fact that Crawford based its rule
on the "Framers' understanding" of the
Confrontation Clause, see 541 U.S. at 59, 68,

and the Court's statement that "the results of
our [prior] decisions have generally been
faithful to the original meaning of the
Confrontation Clause," id. at 60.
Danforth's argument is flawed because it
misconstrues the test governing whether a
rule is new for Teague purposes. We do not
ask whether Crawford's rule is faithful to the
original meaning of the Confrontation Clause
or whether the results of relevant Supreme
Court precedent are consistent with the rule in
Crawford. Instead, we ask "whether
'reasonable jurists hearing petitioner's claim
at the time his conviction became final would
have felt compelled by existing precedent to
rule in his favor."' Houston, 702 N.W.2d at
271 (quoting Graham, 506 'U.S. at 467
quotation
(internal
added)
(emphasis
omitted)). As noted earlier, prior to Cra-oford.
Roberts guided a court's inquiry concerning
whether the admission of an out-of-court
statement violated the Confrontation Clause.
Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 248; see also State
v. King, 622 N.W.2d 800, 807 (Minn. 2001).
Put another way, Danforth's argument
requires "reasonable jurists" to have foreseen
Crawford's significant modification-if not
outright overruling-of Roberts. When
conducting an analysis under Teague, the
Supreme Court has never required such
prescience of lower courts. Furthermore. such
a requirement would not "validate[]
reasonable, good-faith interpretations of
existing precedents made by state courts even
though they are shown to be contrary to later
decisions." Butler, 494 U.S. at 414.
Consequently. Crawford established a new
rule of federal constitutional criminal
procedure for the purposes of Teague.
B.
There are two exceptions to Teague's general
rule that new rules of federal constitutional
criminal procedure are not retroactively
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applicable to cases that were final when that
new rule was announced. Teague, 489 U.S. at
311. The first exception establishes that
Teague's "bar does not apply to rules
forbidding punishment 'of certain primary
conduct [or to] rules prohibiting a certain
category of punishment for a class of
defendants because of their status or
offense."' Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 416,
124 S. Ct. 2504, 159 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2004)
(quoting Peny v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
330, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256
(1989)). The second exception, which is
"known as the 'watershed rule' exception,
applies when the new rule 'requires the
observance of those procedures that are
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' or
'alter our understanding of the bedrock
procedural elements that must be found to
vitiate the fairness of any particular
conviction."' Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270-71
(quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311). Danforth
argues that, if Crawford established a new
rule for Teague purposes, the rule is a
"watershed rule" within Teague's second
exception. The state argues, and the court of
appeals held, that the rule established by
Craviford does not fall within this narrow
exception. Danforth IV, 700 N.W.2d at 53132.
Since the Supreme Court adopted the Teague
framework, it has yet to find a new rule of
federal constitutional criminal procedure that
qualifies as a "watershed rule."* Such a rule
"must be one without which 'the likelihood of
is
seriously
conviction
an
accurate
diminished."' Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 273
(quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 313). A
watershed rule must do more than simply
improve the accuracy of a proceeding; it must
be "essential to fundamental fairness of a

proceeding." Id. The only rule that the
Supreme Court has stated would fall within
this exception is the right to trial counsel
established by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372

U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799
(1963). Beard, 542 U.S. at 417. These rules

are extremely rare, and the Supreme Court
recently stated that it is unlikely any
watershed rules have yet to be announced.
Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352.
The rule announced in Craviford cannot meet
the stringent requirements of this exception.

First, Crawford imposed a bright line rule of
exclusion for a certain

class of hearsay

statements based on the original intent of the
Confrontation Clause. See 541 U.S. at 59, 68.
Even when dealing with a fundamental right,

the appropriate inquiry under Teague is not
whether the new rule reflects the framers'
intent, but whether jurisprudence under the
"old rule" seriously diminished the accuracy
of a criminal proceeding. See Schriro, 542
U.S. at 355-56. Given that, prior to Crawford,
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence focused
on the reliability of out-of-court statements,
see Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, the likelihood of
obtaining an accurate conviction is not
seriously diminished in the absence of the rule
established by Crawford. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has indicated that some new rules of
criminal procedure, though constitutionally
based, may actually decrease the likelihood of
an accurate determination of guilt or
innocence. See Butler, 494 U.S. at 411, 416
(stating that a violation of the procedural rule
in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675. 108 S.
Ct. 2093, 100 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1988). may
increase the likelihood of an accurate
determination of guilt or innocence). The
same argument could be made here, for while
in some cases a Craviford violation would
decrease the likelihood of an accurate
determination of guilt or innocence (i.e.,
admitting an unreliable statement), in other
cases statements admissible under the Roberts
test but excluded under the Cravwford test
would be highly reliable and helpful to the
jury's determination. While the additional
protections of Craiford effectuate the
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original meaning of the Sixth Amendment,
the absence of Craw"ford's bright line rule
would not "seriously diminish the likelihood
of obtaining an accurate determination" of
innocence or guilt. See Butler, 494 U.S. at
416.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has also looked
at pre-existing protections for defendants
when examining whether a new procedural
rule is an "'absolute prerequisite to
fundamental fairness'
as required by
Teague's second exception. See Sawyer, 497
U.S. at 243-44 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at
314). Given the pre-existing Confrontation
Clause protections for defendants under
Roberts, Crawford's rule is not "essential to

the fundamental fairness of a proceeding."
Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 273.
For all of the above reasons, the rule
established by Crawford does not qualify as a
"watershed rule" for the purposes of Teague's
second exception. Therefore, Crawford
established a new rule of federal
constitutional criminal procedure that is not
within one of Teague's exceptions and, given
that Danforth's case was final at the time of
the Crawford decision, Danforth cannot
receive the retroactive application of
Crawford to his case.
AFFIRMED.
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"Court Query on Teague Retroactivity"
SCOTUSBlog.com
March 21, 2007
Lyle Denniston
The Supreme Court indicated on Tuesday
that at least some Justices are interested in
claims by state prisoners that they should be
able to get more retroactive benefit out of
U.S. Supreme Court decisions that lay down
new rules of criminal procedure. The
Court's electronic docket shows an order
asking the state of Minnesota to discuss that
question.
Here is the inquiry the Court posed in the
pending case of Danforth v. Minnesota (06-

8273): "Are state supreme courts required to
use the standard announced in Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), to determine
whether United States Supreme Court
decisions apply retroactively to state-court
criminal cases, or may a state court apply
state-law
or
state-constitution-based
retroactivity tests that afford application of
Supreme Court decisions to a broader class
of criminal defendants than the class defined
by Teague?."
A number of state courts have divided on
that question.
In the case of Stephen Danforth, who filed
the petition in 06-8273, the Minnesota
Supreme Court declared: "Danforth argues
that Teague dictates the limits of retroactive
application of new rules only in federal
habeas corpus proceedings and does not
limit the retroactive application of new rules
in state post-conviction proceedings.
Danforth is incorrect when he asserts that
state courts are free to give a Supreme Court
decision of federal constitutional criminal
procedure broader retroactive application
than that given by the Supreme Court. . . .

We cannot apply state retroactivity
the
determining
when
principles
retroactivity of a new rule of federal
constitutional criminal procedure if the
Supreme Court has already provided
relevant federal principles" (emphasis in
original).
The Minnesota court, though, noted that
other state courts have declined to apply
Teague's retroactivity principles or have
found they could apply those principles as a
matter of choice only. It cited decisions in
Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, Nevada and
South Dakota.
In Danforth's case, the Supreme Court
decision that he wanted to apply
retroactively to his criminal case was
Crawford v. Washington, a 2004 ruling
limiting use at trial of out-of-court
"testimonial statements" that had not been
The
to
cross-examination..
subject
Minnesota court, applying Teague, ruled
that Crawiford was not to be applied
retroactively in state cases. In that regard,
the state court anticipated what the Supreme
Court itself would decide in Whorton v.
Bockting (05-595) on Feb. 28.
But, Danforth's public defender lawyers
have argued that, if the retroactivity question
is governed not by Teague but by Minnesota
law, Danforth would be able to take
advantage of the Crawford ruling in his
criminal sexual conduct case involving a
six-year-old boy; his conviction became
final no later than 1999.
Under Teague v. Lane. a criminal law
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decision by the U.S. Supreme Court is
generally not applicable to state cases where
the conviction had become final and the
prisoner is making a post-conviction
challenge. But a new rule does apply
retroactively if the rule is "a watershed rule
of criminal procedure implicating the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the
criminal proceeding." The Court has never
found a new procedure ruling that qualifies
for retroactivity under Teague.
Danforth's lawyer filed his Supreme Court
appeal on Dec. 6, and the state of Minnesota
opted not to respond. The petition raised two
issues-the first was the question about
federal vs. state retroactivity principles, and
the second was specifically about Crawiford
retroactivity. The Court in January asked for
a response. The state filed a brief opposing
review on Feb. 12, but only responded to the
second question. arguing that Crawsford
should not be applied retroactively.

that the state had acted as if the second
question were the only one raised. The
retroactivity issue, the reply said, is of "vital
importance to state courts, state-court
practitioners, state-court judges, state-court
prosecutors, and state-court defendants. This
Court should grant certiorari of this case to
answer it."
The case had been set for Conference on
March 16. but the Court took no action on it
then. The case obviously had been held
pending the ruling in Whorton. After the
petition was set for Conference this week,
the Court on Tuesday asked the state for a
further response, dealing with the Teague
question as Danforth's lawyer had phrased
it. It is unclear how many Justices concurred
in asking the question.
By raising it,
consideration.
Teague point
lawyer will be

however, the Court put off
The state's response on the
is due April 19. Danforth's
able to file a reply.

Danforth's defender replied to that, arguing
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"Judge Raises Repeat Pedophile's Sentence
Because of His History"
Star-TribuneNewspaper of the Twin Cities Mpls.-St. Paul
August 5, 1998
James Walsh
Stephen Danforth, a former lawyer and
repeat pedophile, was sentenced Tuesday to
more than 26 years in prison for molesting a
6-year-old boy nearly three years ago.
Danforth was convicted of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct, and sentenced by
Hennepin County District Judge Richard
Solum to 18 years in prison, more than two
years ago. But the state Court of Appeals
ruled in December that Danforth, who has a
history of molesting boys, had to be resentenced to a longer term.
Solum's sentence was five years longer than
recommended by state guidelines for
someone with no history of sex offenses.
But the repeat sex offender statute requires
at least double the guidelines sentence.
District Judge Dan Mabley, took the case
after Solum retired in June.
After Mabley asked Danforth, 47, whether
he wished to make a statement before
sentencing. Danforth began reading a letter
he had intended to send to Solum. As he did
two years ago while defending himself,
Danforth proclaimed his innocence while
striking out at the "vicious prosecutors who
have conspired to stamp out child abuse."
Mabley listened for several minutes, then
interrupted: "Mr. Danforth, I can't undo
what the jury did. Even Judge Solum can't
undo what the jury did. The question is,
what is the appropriate sentence?"
After promising to

limit his remarks,

Danforth resumed talking about how the
charges were false. Mabley told Danforth
that enough was enough.
Finding that Danforth met the criteria for the
repeat-offender statute-and that he needs
long-term treatment or supervision beyond
the presumptive sentence and supervised
release-Mabley sentenced Danforth to 26
years.
Mabley said he believes a psychiatrist's
report that Danforth is a pattern sex
offender. Mabley, who said he thinks
Danforth has little chance of completing sex
offender treatment, also sentenced him to at
least 10 years of supervised probation "if
you are ever released."
Danforth was convicted of sexually touching
and penetrating the 6-year-old boy, the son
of a friend, at a swimming pool in Richfield
in July 1995. The boy's 4-year-old sister
saw the molestation when she walked into a
changing room.
The law school graduate said the boy's
family pressured him to make up the
accusations. He said at trial that he
sometimes fooled around in his underwear
with the boy and kissed him once. But,
Danforth claimed, he never abused him.
Danforth said he resolved to turn to looking
at pictures of children for his sexual
gratification after a 1988 conviction for
having sex with several boys. [The Supreme
Court is set to hear the case, Danforth v.
Minnesota, this term.]
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"Jury Ponders Sex Abuse Case
Against Ex-Attorney"
Star-TribuneNewspaper of the Twin Cities Mpls.-St. Paul
March 5, 1996
David Peterson
A former attorney told a jury in Minneapolis
on Monday that although he is guilty of a
multitude of "petty insanities and strange
practices," he did not sexually molest a 6year-old boy last summer.
In closing arguments after two weeks of
testimony, 45-year-old Stephen Danforth
looked and sounded like an exasperated
college professor trying to deliver a fourhour lecture in half an hour.
The defendant, who represented himself
during the trial, asked jurors to acquit him of
one count of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct despite his history of child sexual
abuse and despite the sexually explicit
material found in his possession.
"Call me a voyeur, fine," he said, "but don't
find me guilty of this heinous thing."
The boy accused him of abusing him in the
men's changing room at a swimming pool in
Richfield in July. His 4-year-old sister said
she saw it happen. although she was unable
to identify the defendant in the courtroom.
During closing arguments, one juror left the
courtroom twice to vomit. She admitted to
Judge Richard Solum that she'd drunk too
much the previous night. Solum dismissed
her from the jury. Said prosecutor Kathryn
Quaintance, out of the jury's earshot: "This
case could make anyone go on a bender."
Both sides in the case agreed that Danforth
had developed a strange relationship with a
troubled family whose members knew of his

criminal record for sexual abuse and kept an
eye on him for that reason. He became an
uncle figure for the younger children in the
family.
Danforth said he sometimes fooled around
in his underwear with the boy who later
accused him, and kissed him once. "Was
that silly? Yeah. Foolish? Yeah." But the
criminal accusation resulted from the
parents' paranoia, their "long and growing,
smoldering dislike" for him, and coaching of
the children, he said.
A gray-haired, balding man in a gray suit,
his glasses halfway down his nose, Danforth
delivered arguments laced with literary
allusions-he referred at one point to his
own "Pervert's Progress"-and spoke so
rapidly that the judge and the court reporter
asked him to slow down.
After a prison term for
said. he resolved to
children for sexual
become a voyeur," he
do .

.

child molestation, he
turn to pictures of
gratification. "I've
said. "That's what I

. but if you think for one second that

for some infinitesimal thrill" he would
molest a child, that's wrong.
Judge Solum started by reminding Danforth
that he'd been found in contempt twice
during the trial, and ended by advising him
repeatedly to wrap it up. Danforth concluded
his arguments by saying, "I wish I had more
time to tell you the whole story."
In her arguments, prosecutor Quaintance
said the child witness failed to identify the
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defendant because his appearance has
changed greatly. She said that nothing about
the children's demeanor indicated any
coaching. They liked Danforth, she said, and
it was painful for them to reveal the truth.

The camera then followed him and focused
in on his naked genitals. As the tape
continued she stood beside the TV monitor
and kept saying that contrary to Danforth's
claim, "This wasn't accidental." [The
Supreme Court is set to hear the case,

She showed a videotape she said Danforth
had taken of a young boy using the toilet.

Danforth i. Minnesota, this term.]
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"Former Attorney Practices Self-Defense
in Child Sex Abuse Case"
Star-TribuneNewspaper of the Twin Cities Mpls.-St. Paul
February 16, 1996
John McIntyre
A former attorney stepped before a jury in a
Hennepin County courtroom Thursday and
gave the opening statement in his own
defense at his trial on charges of sexually
assaulting a child.
Stephen Danforth, 45, was charged with
first-degree criminal sexual conduct last
summer after a 6-year-old boy told
investigators that he had sexually assaulted
him in the men's changing room at a
swimming pool in Richfield in July.
"Those are false accusations," Danforth told
the jury Thursday. "At no time did I abuse
him.... I'm innocent."
Kathryn Quaintance, the assistant county
attorney who is prosecuting the case, quietly
but bluntly explained the charge during her
brief opening statement: Criminal sexual
conduct in the first degree is sexual conduct
with penetration.
She told the jury that it would learn how
Danforth "worked himself into the family.
How he gained trust . . . especially the

boy's."
She said he took the family, which was
troubled, on trips and bought presents.
But during a trip to the pool, Danforth
sexually abused the boy, she said. The boy's
4-year-old sister wandered into the changing
room and saw the assault, Quaintance said.
She said jurors will see a videotape that

places Danforth and the two children in the
changing room together.
In his opening statement Danforth told the
jury that although he'd been to law school
he hadn't worked in a courtroom for 20
years. His statement, he said, would not be
the "slick, professional presentation of Mrs.
Quaintance's."
More than two hours and three dozen
prosecution objections later, it was clear that
Danforth wasn't being modest.
His wandering monologue was often
repetitious and interrupted by prosecution
objections-nearly three dozen, most
sustained-and
admonishments
from
District Judge Richard Solum to discuss the
evidence and avoid arguing the case.
Still, several threads of Danforth's defense
emerged.
He acknowledged that he'd been in trouble
before. According to police reports, he was
convicted of three counts of criminal sexual
conduct in the first degree for having sexual
contact with several juveniles.
He told the jury he'd become almost an
"uncle" to the boy. But family members
were aware of Danforth s record and were
worried that he might assault their son. "It
rose to a hair-trigger state of apprehension
built on the imagination or dreams of a little
boy," Danforth said. When an allegation
arose, they were ready to believe it, he said.
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He said that despite the claims of sexual
penetration, medical reports showed no sign
of pain or injury to the boy. Moreover, he
said, witnesses would testify that the boy
remained affectionate toward Danforth in
the days that followed the alleged assault.
The boy's account of the assault parrots a
story provided by parents and therapists,
Danforth said.
"His testimony will leave you with the
impression of a child whose mind was worn
down, who surrendered," Danforth said.
After he finished, and the jury was released
for lunch, Quaintance angrily told Solum
that Danforth extended his opening
statement from a planned 25 minutes to
manipulate the system and tire out the two
young witnesses who were waiting to
testify. They did not testify Thursday. The
issue of the children's welfare arose earlier
Thursday when Quaintance asked Solum to

review the questions Danforth would ask on
cross-examination.
"It's clear he has no idea what parameters of
proper cross-examination are," Quaintance
said. "Clearly, a proven pedophile's right to
defend himself isn't a right to go free-for-all
on children."
Danforth replied that it was unheard of for a
judge to review a lawyer's "script" for
cross-examination. Furthermore, he said, he
won't know what questions he'll ask until
the case unfolds. "They are accusers," he
said of the children. "It's up to the jury to
decide if they're victims."
Solum set limits on how much Danforth
could ask about previous sexual assaults
against the children. [The Supreme Court is
set to hear the case, Danforth v. Minnesota,
this term.]
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"Child Sex Abuser Given Prison Sentence"
Star-TribuneNewspaper of the Twin Cities Mpls.-St. Paul
February 25, 1988
Larry Oakes
A Twin Cities man described .by court
officials as one of the most cunning
pedophiles to be prosecuted locally in recent
years was sentenced Tuesday in Hennepin
County District Court to almost seven years
in prison.
Stephen Danforth, 36, who police say
previously lived in Wisconsin, had pleaded
guilty to having sex with four boys at his
Minneapolis apartment, and paying them to
pose nude for photographs.
Danforth, also known as Stephen Danforth
Rabideau, also has pleaded guilty in Ramsey
County to having sex with some of the same
victims while living in St. Paul.
His sentencing on those counts was
scheduled for May 3. A Ramsey County
judge ruled Wednesday that Danforth's
sentencing could be delayed until that date
to give time for a psychiatric profile
requested by the defense.
Danforth's attorney, Marilyn Knudsen,
declined to comment on his behalf.
Authorities said they have evidence that
during the past decade in both Wisconsin
and Minnesota, Danforth lured at least 10
children-eight boys and two girls-into
sexual relationships by being friendly to
them and offering them money, gifts and
trips.
St. Paul police have said that Danforth took
boys to Wisconsin and Disney World in
Florida, among other places.

Judy Johnston, an assistant Hennepin
County attorney, said Danforth, who ran a
legal research firm in Minneapolis, preyed
upon children who had no meaningful
relationships with their fathers, and often
saw the children with the approval of their
mothers.
"They thought he was just a friendly guy
who cared about their kids," Johnston said.
Danforth's hold on the children was so
strong that none initially would talk to
police and some still have mixed feelings,
officials said.
At Danforth's sentencing, Hennepin County
District Judge Henry W. McCarr said that
based on a pre-sentence evaluation,
Danforth would be "an ongoing danger to
society" if his sentence was limited to his
requested probation and treatment.
Johnston said that in preparing for trial
against Danforth on the local cases, the
prosecution located six alleged victims from
Wisconsin who were prepared to testify that
Danforth engaged in the same conduct with
them in Madison in the mid-1970s.
Danforth was charged in connection with
some of those incidents, but the charges
were dropped when he agreed to treatment,
Johnston said.
The alleged victims' testimony would have
been introduced not as additional charges,
but as supporting evidence of the
defendant's criminal behavior.
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Johnston, a member of a county attorney's
team formed to prosecute child sex cases,
said Danforth is "one of the more
serious offenders we've prosecuted for this
crime . .. because of the number of victims,

the length of victimization, the fact that he
continued even after he knew he was being
investigated, and his strong verbal and
manipulative skills."
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